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Editor's Brief 
Four articles in this issue represent development of diverse areas of Virginia law. 
Our first article focuses on an aspect of the national concern over the AIDS virus. 
However, the five articles do more than convey information about the topics they 
contain. They are samples of the caliber of writing that the students of the College 
of William and Mary's Marshall-Wythe School of Law produce every semester. 
The disease of AIDS has spawned much discussion in legal circles concerning 
societal treatment of its victims. Mr. Sotelo assesses federal laws regarding the hand-
icapped and their applicability to AIDS sufferers in our first article. 
Contrasted with the emotionally charged topic of AIDS is the subject ofliquidated 
damages provisions in construction contracts. Ms. Soraghan's work discusses the val-
idity of such provisions when both the contractor and the contractor's customer are 
responsible for a delay in the completion of a project. 
Mr. Gray's piece invites legislative or judicial reform of Virginia's libel law as 
its affects public school teachers and the press in small towns. He argues that the 
protection of the teachers afforded by the current state of the defamation case law 
comes at the expense of threatening the viability of small town publishers, who thrive 
on coverage of such figures. 
In an increasingly crowded society, determination of land use rights are critical. 
Mr. Lady discusses competing lines of precedent in deciding whether and at what 
stage land use rights vest in their holders. 
Should a person who kills another human being during the comission of a felony 
be chargeable with murder or manslaughter? Mr. Thomas' article thoroughly reviews 
the confusion of the Virginia courts in dealing with this difficult legal question, and 
offers suggested jury instructions when the situation arises. 
I wish to make a special note of thanks to Mr. Thomas the Managing Editor, for 
all his hard work in making this issue one of our best to date. 
We here at The Colonial Lawyer: A Journal of Virginia Law and Public Policy 
hope that you, the scholar and the practitioner, find the following articles of Volume 
17 Number 2 insightful and stimulating, and we welcome any comments you might 
have for this or future issues. 
Felicia L. Silber 
Senior Editor 
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AIDS: HANDICAP OR NOT? 
INTRODUCTION 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a problem of economic, 
ethical, legal, medical, political, and social dimensions. One issue that cuts across 
the legal and social dimensions of AIDS is the possibility of discrimination in the 
workplace. The thesis of this paper is that persons who have contracted AIDS or 
ARC (AIDS-related complex) or who are infected with the virus (HTLV-II1 [human 
T cell lymphotropic virus type III] or HIV [Human Immunodeficiency Syndrome» 
or who are perceived as carriers of AIDS are "individual[s] with [a] handicap(s)"l 
and thus protected by anti-discrimination statutes. 
Part I will describe the significance of the AIDS problem and the nature of 
the syndrome. Part II will analyze whether persons with AIDS, ARC, HTL V-III, 
or who are perceived as having AIDS, are individuals with a handicap within the 
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Act). Part III reviews case law 
dealing with the issue of whether AIDS can be classified as a handicap. Part IV 
discusses the reason for classifying such persons as handicapped. 
PART I 
"The United States Public Health Service has called Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) the nation's number one health priority."2 The 
extent of the AIDS problem is apparent when one considers both the number of 
persons who have contracted AIDS and the number of persons who are estimated 
to be infected with the virus. By May of 1988, the Center for Disease Control 
(CDC) had received a total of 62,000 reports of AIDS cases.s The total is 
1 29 U.S.C. Sec. 706(8)(b) (Supp. IV 1986). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
utilized the phrase "handicapped individual" and was amended in 1986 to 
"individual with handicaps": 
The term "handicapped individual is changed to 
"individual with handicaps." This change was 
suggested by persons representing individuals 
with disabilities who testified before the 
Subcommittee that by retaining the adjective 
"handicapped" before the noun "person" the 
legislation might be inadvertently adding to the 
stereotype that persons with handicaps are less 
worthy. 
H.R. 571, 99th Con g., 2d Sess. Sec. 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. 
News 3471, 3487. 
2 Note, The Constitutional Right oj AIDS Carriers, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1274 
(1986) (citing to U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, FACTS ABOUT AIDS I (1984». 
S Washington Post, June 3, 1988, at Al & A14. In Virginia, 784 cases of 
AIDS have been reported, while it is estimated that between 23,000 to 78,000 
persons are infected with HTLV-Ill. 6 Port Folio Magazine 10 (August 16, 1988). 
expected to continue to increase in the future:' Approximately 1.5 million 
Americans are infected with the virus that has the potential of causing AIDS or 
ARC.5 
HTLV-1I1 is the virus that mayor may not cause AIDS. A person infected 
with the virus may remain asymptomatic, develop ARC, or progress to a case of 
AIDS.6 AIDS is the possible severe result of HTLV-III infection. "AIDS is a 
syndrome,,1 that attacks and breaks down the immune system of a person and 
makes him susc~ptible to infection.8 The suppressing of the immune system makes 
the body susceptible to "opportunistic" diseases.9 Pneumocystis carini; 
pneumonia 10 and Karposi's sarcoma 11 are two examples of opportunistic diseases 
associated with AIDS .. 
The symptoms of AIDS are physical and mental. Physical effects range from 
weight loss to consistently swollen glands, coughing or shortness of breath to 
skin rashes and spots. 12 AIDS also decreases the ability of the mind to remember 
4 Washington Post, June 3, 1988, at Al & A14. "According to the most 
recent PHS· estimates, that figure [62,OOOJ will grow nearly five times to 300?000 
by the end of 1992." Id. 
5. Id. 
The Public Health Service (PHS) estimates 
that up to 1.5 million Americans are now 
infected with the AIDS virus. Many of them 
do not know they are infected. And federal 
officials now believe that infected people 
could all eventually become ill if no 
effective treatment is developed. Id. 
6 V. Gong, AIDS: Facts and Issues, 10-12 (V. Gong and N. Rudnick, eds. 1986). 
1 W. Banta, AIDS in the Workplace, 1-2 (1988). AIDS opens people up to 
disease and infection that results in death. AIDS does not directly cause the 
fatality. Id. 
8 P. Douglas & L. Pinsky, The Essential AIDS Fact Book, 13 (1987). The 
Center for Disease Control defines AIDS as: 
absence of all known underlying causes 
of cellular immunodeficiency (other than 
HTL V -III/LA V infection) and absence of 
all other causes of reduced resistance 
reported to be associated with at least 
one of those opportunistic diseases. 
W. Dornette, AIDS and the Law, 264 app. B (1987). 
9 P. Douglas & L. Pinsky, The Essential AIDS Fact Book, IS (1987). 
10 V. Gong, supra note 6, at 65-67. 
11 Id. at 80-85. 
'12 Id. at 49-53. 
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or recall information (dementia).IS The almost certain result of AIDS is death.14 
ARC (AIDS-related complex) is a less severe, usually non-fatal possible result of 
HTLV-III infection.15 ARC mayor may not progress into AIDS. 
AIDS is an acquired syndrome. The weight of data lies against being infected 
via casual contact with a person infected with the virus, ARC, or AIDS.16 HTL V-
III cannot be -transmitted through contact such as handshakes, hugging, sharing of 
food and beverages with a person who is either infected with the virus, ARC, or 
AIDS.17 The reason for this is that the virus is fragile. 18 For example, the 
human skin acts as a barrier to the virus and prevents it from entering the 
bloodstream.19 The virus must enter the bloodstream of a person to represent a 
danger of infection. 
Transmission occurs in a number of ways. The first is the transfer of bodily 
fluids (semen, vaginal, cervical secretions) during sexual contact.20 The 
transmission can occur during vaginal, rectum, or oral-genital sex and to a 
IS Picot, Living in the Shadows 0/ AIDS, 6 Port Folio Magazine 9 (August 
16, 1988). 
14 Washington Post, supra note 4, at Al & A4. 
Because no one has ever been cured of 
AIDS, a 99 percent AIDS rate [based on 
a study of homosexual men] means that 
virtually all would die unless a treat-
ment is developed. 'The picture gets 
worse as we see more data,' said Dr. 
William W. Darrow, a researcher at the 
federal Center for Disease Control (CDC). 
'We have to assume this model would hold 
up for all other infected groups as well.' Id. 
15 V. Gong, supra note 6, at 13. 
16 Douglas & Pinsky, supra note 9, at 19. "Every major scientific study 
has concluded that AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual contact." Id. 
17 See generally P. Douglas & L. Pinsky, The Essential AIDS Fact Book, 
19-21 (1987), R. Liebmann-Smith, The Question 0/ AIDS, 42-57 (1985). 
18 Douglas & Pinsky, supra note 9, at 20. 
19 Id. at 18. 
20 R. Liebmann-Smith, The Question 0/ AIDS, 42-46 (1985). 
Epidemiological studies showed that a 
person could contract AIDS from sexual 
contact with a single infective indi-
vidual, that one could be exposed to 
such an individual and not contract the 
disease, and that some people could 
apparently infect others without them-
selves being clinically ill. Id. at 45. 
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greater degree if there exist abrasions to the lining of the vagina, rectum or 
areas of the mouth.21 Transmission may also occur with the sharing of 
unsterilized needles associated with intra venous-drug use,22 the transfusion of 
infected blood and blood products,23 and perinatal.24 
PART II 
The Act25 will be used as a reference point to determine whether those 
afflicted with the virus, ARC, or AIDS, or perceived to be infected with AIDS are 
individuals with a handicap. Section 504 of the Act provides that any program 
that receives federal funding may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified 
individual with a handicap based upon the existence of the handicap.26 The 
congressional purpose behind section 504 was to prevent individuals with 
handicaps from being discriminated against in all phases of life.27 
The Act distinguishes between three categories of persons for purposes of 
determining whether a person has a handicap: I) those individuals with either "a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person's major life activities,"28 2) those persons who have "a record of such an 
impairment,"29 or 3) those persons "regarded as having such an impairment."'3o 
21 Douglas & Pinsky, supra note 9, at 18-19. 
22 Liebmann-Smith, supra note 20, at 46-50. 
23 Supra note 9 at 19. 
24 [d. 
25 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. 
Sec. 701-796 (Supp. IV 1986». 
26 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794 (Supp. IV 1986). 
No otherwise qualified individual with 
handicaps in the United States, as defined 
in section 706(8) of this title, shall, 
solely by reason of his handicap, be 
excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance ... .ld. 
27 S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
Code Congo & Admin. News 6373, 6388. 
Section 504 was enacted to prevent dis-
crimination against all handicapped 
individuals, ... ,in relation to Federal 
assistance in employment, ... , or any 
other Federally-aided programs. [d. 
28 29 U.S.C. Sec. 706(8)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1986). 
29 29 U.S.C. Sec. 706(8)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986). 
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Regulations promulgated define a physical or mental impairment as either a 
physiological disorderSI or any mental or psychological disorder.s2 "Major life 
activities" encompass the daily tasks of living such as working.ss A person who 
"has a record of impairment" has either a history of impairment and recovery or 
has been misclassified as having an impairment.s• A person "regarded as having 
such an impairment" is either a person with a handicap that does not substantially 
limit major life activities, except for a person's attitude toward hims5, or a 
person who does not possess an impairment but is treated as possessing the 
impairmen t. S6 
An "otherwise Qualified handicapped" person is one who with reasonable 
accommodation by an employer or none at all can perform the tasks of a job.s7 
Assessment as to whether reasonable accommodation can be achieved takes in 
such factors as undue hardship to the employer, the size of the business or 
so 29 U.S.c. Sec. 706(8)(B)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986). 
SI 
means: 
45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(i)(A) (1987). A physical or mental impairment 
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, 
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical 
loss affecting one or more of the following 
body systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal; 
special sense organs; respiratory, in-
cluding speech organs, cardiovascular, re-
productive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic 
and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; .... ld. 
S2 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(i)(B) (1987). A physical or mental impairment 
can also mean: 
(B) any mental or psychological disorder, 
such as mental retardation, organic brain 
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and 
specific learning disabilities. ld. 
ss 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(ii) (1987). 
'Major life activities' means functions 
such as caring for one's self, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, 
speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working. ld. 
S. 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(iii) (1987). 
S5 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3 (h)(2)(iv)(A) & (B) (1987). 
36 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(iv)(C) (1987). 
37 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(i) (1987). 
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program, facilities, budgetary constraints, type of business or program, and the 
nature and cost of accommodation.38 
In determining whether the handicap status of the Act applies to persons 
encompassed within the AIDS issue, three groups of persons must be 
differentiated: those individuals with AIDS, those individuals that exhibit symptoms 
of ARC, and those' individuals that are either carriers of the virus but 
asymptomat'ic, members of high risk groups (ie. homosexuals), family members of 
AIDS or ARC victims, or those persons perceived as having AIDS. Persons with 
AIDS are individuals with a handicap substantially limiting major life activities. 
AIDS victims suffer both physical and mental impairment. The regulations defined 
physical impairment as any physiological condition that impacts upon certain body 
systems.39 AIDS impacts upon both the hemic and lymphatic systems of the 
immuJU: system.40 HTL V -III attacks the immune system (breaking down the 
function of the hemic and lymphatic systems) and. opens the body up to 
opportunistic diseases and infectio'n. 
While the. regulations promulgated do. not speak explicitly of the immune 
system, one author has concluded that the statutory definition of physical 
impairment should not be read narrowly and is not an all inclusive list of physical 
impairments.41 Dementia is also an example of a physical impairment affecting 
38 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.10 (1987). 
39 Supra notes 31, 32. 
40 See generally Note, AIDS and Employment Discrimination: Should AIDS 
be considered a handicap?, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1106 (1987); Note, Does it qualify as 
a "Handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 583 (1986). 
41 Note, Does it qualify as a "Handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act of 
197 3?, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev .. 583-84 (1986). The declared congressional purpose 
behind the Rehabilitation Act suggests that Congress's concern was on providing 
equal opportunity for employability to persons with handicaps: 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop 
and implement, ... , and the guarantee of 
equal opportunity, ... ,for individuals with 
handicaps in order to maximize their 
employability, independence, and integration 
i,nto the workplace and the community. 
29 U.S.C. Sec. 70 I (Supp. IV 1986). The purpose reflects the intention to 
integrate those with handicaps into society. Such a goal supports the view that 
the statute should be broadly interpreted and applied. 
6 
AIDS victims. '2 
impairment. 
AIDS victims meet the first criteria of physical or mental 
The second criteria,that the impairment must be one that "substantial[ly] 
limits", is harder to clarify because the regulations do not directly speak to this 
issue.'s The plain language of the regulations show that "substantial limits" 
modifies "major life activities." Because AIDS is a crippling disease and in most 
cases causes death, a person with AIDS lacks control over his body's response to 
the virus and thus the physical impairment is a substantial limit to a major life 
activity (fighting illness).·' 
Additionally, AIDS is a substantial limit in the sense ~hat a stigma is attached 
to persons with AIDS. The stigma results in isolation and non-participation in 
society.'6 One author has suggested that "substantial limits" refers to 
employability and the proper question is to what extent does the impairment 
affect employability.'6 Regardless of the manner in which "substantial limits" is 
construed, it is clear that one must assess the impact of the, physical impairment 
upon one or more major life activities. 
"Major, life activities" as suggested by the regulations encompass the ability to 
live day to day:47 AIDS makes the victim non-resistant to infection and in need 
of constant medical treatment: The victim is unable to care for himself in a 
normal fashion. Maintenance of good health is one example of a major life 
'2 Picot, supra note 13, at 9. 
AIDS is a disease of loss, loss of control 
of one's body, one's mind, one's life. As 
the disease progresses, AIDS victims suffer 
not only physical but mental deterioration. 
HIV rides into the brain inside the white 
blood cells which it infects. In ways which 
are still not clear, the presence of the 
virus damages the nerve cells of the cerebral 
cortex, a center of intellectual function in 
human beings. AIDS patients suffer at first 
subtle and later more profound decreases in 
their intellectual abilities,suffering loss 
of memory and other mental functions. Id. 
's Note absence from C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3 (1987). ' 
.. Note, Does it qualify as a "HandiCap" under the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973?; 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 584, 584-6 
(1986). " ' 
'6 Note, AIDS and Employment Discrimination: Should AIDS be considered a 
handicap?, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1106-07 (1987). 
'6 Id. 
n Supra note 33. 
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activity." The progression of the disease can decrease the ability of the AIDS 
victim to work from either a physical or mental aspect.49 Work is a major life 
activity as defined in the regulations.50 The stigma that AIDS victims encounter 
also limits their meaningful participation in society (major life activity) in relation 
to their family, friends. employers, and co-workers.51 
AIDS victims are individuals with a handicap within the meaning of the Act. 
Determination as to whether or not AIDS is an otherwise qualified handicap for 
purposes of working must be decided on a case by case basis. Persons who have 
ARC or are members of groups who are perceived to have AIDS (virus carriers. 
ARC persons. homosexuals, family and friends of AIDS or ARC victims, etc.) are 
handicapped in two ways. First, the Act's definition of a person with a handicap 
indicates that one who "has a record of such an impairment" (history of illness or 
misclassification) is a handicapped person within the Act.52 Regardless of 
whether the person has the impairment, the person is treated by others as having 
the impairment and thus as an individual with a handicap.63 
Secondly, persons who are treated as having AIDS but do not are protected by 
the third definition of an individual with a handicap. The Act provides that 
those persons "regarded as having such an impairment" are individuals with a 
handicap for purposes of the Act.54 This protection encompasses those members 
48 Supra note 44, at 585-86. 
49 Supra notes 13 and 45. 
60 Supra note 33. 
61 Supra note 44. 
62 Supra note 34. 
63 Supra note 45. at 1107. 
64 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1232.3(h)(2)(iv) (1987). The legislative history to the 
Rehabilitation Act Amendments indicates that the definition of a person with a 
handicap includes: 
those persons who are discriminated against 
on the basis of handicap whether or not they 
are in fact handicapped..... This subsection 
includes within the protection of sections 
503 and 504 those persons who do not in fact 
have the condition which they are perceived 
as having, as well as. those persons whose 
mental or physical condition does not sub-
stantially limit their life activities and 
who thus are not technically within clause 
(A) in the new definition. Members of both 
these groups may be subjected to discrimina-
tion on the basis of their being regarded as 
handicapped. 
S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Congo & 
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of high risk groups (ie. homosexuals), those persons who test positive for 
antibodies of AIDS, carriers of the virus, persons with ARC, family and friends of 
AIDS victims. 55 
PART III 
Recent decisions of courts in the United States support the position that 
victims of AIDS, ARC, or carriers of the virus, or persons perceived as being 
infected with AIDS, should be handicapped within the meaning of the Act. 56 In 
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District, the district court held that a child 
who was infected with the AIDS virus and showing signs of ARC was an 
individual with a handicap and otherwise qualified to attend school for purposes 
of application of the Act.57 The boy, Ryan Thomas, is a child infected with 
HTLV-III and was eligible at the time of the case to attend kindergarten class at 
a public school that received federal financial assistance.58 The boy suffered 
from pulmonary and middle ear problems and chronic lymphadenopathy.59 These 
symptoms indicate a person with ARC.60 
The court concluded based upon the medical problems that the boy suffers 
from substantial impairment of his major life activities.61 The court focused on 
the transmission of the AIDS virus and held that the disease is not transmitted 
through casual contact with a person infected.62 Therefore, the risk of 
transmission is not present in the school context and the school district cannot 
Admin. News 6373, 6389-90. 
55 Supra notes 44, 45. 
56 This paper presents only three of the cases that address the question 
and does not intend to cover or speak for all such cases. 
57 662 F.Supp. 376 (C.D.Cal. 1987). 
58 [d. at 379. 
59 [d. 
60 V.Gong, supra note 6, at 50-53. 
61 662 F.Supp. at 379-380. 
62 [d. at 380. 
The best available medical evidence shows 
that the AIDS virus is not spread in the 
air by infected droplets as are the common 
cold, influenza and tuberculosis. The virus 
is fragile and is killed by most household 
disinfectants. The virus is transmitted 
from one person to another only by infected 
blood, semen, or vaginal fluids (and, 
possibly, mother's milk). Transmission 
by either semen or blood accounts for vir-
tually all reported cases. [d. 
9 
use as the basis of its decision to exclude the boy the mere fact that he has the 
AIDS virus and symptoms of ARC.6S 
The court in Thomas relied upon a decision from New York in finding section 
504 of the Act applicable to the facts. . In the Matter 0/ District 27 Community 
School Board v. City 0/ New York, a seven-year old child was diagnosed as having 
AIDS and a review panel cleared his attendance at school.64 The review panel 
concluded that the child should remain in school because he had remained healthy 
and had attended school in the previous years.65 Two local community school 
boards brought an action seeking an injunction prohibiting the child from 
attending school.66 While the case was at trial, the health commissioner placed 
the child's case before a second review panel. The panel unanimously concluded 
that the <tJ!.ild did not meet the CDC's definition of a person with AIDS.67 The 
child was classified as being infected with the virus and evidencing some immune 
su ppression. 68 
The court, recognizing that the issues originally before it were now moot, 
proceeded to rule on those issues given the importance and likely recurrence of 
such issues and because it was in the public's best interest.69 Because HTL V -III 
attacks and destroys lymphocytes, the court held that children with AIDS suffer 
from a physical impairment.7o The decision further suggests that a person who is 
regarded as having an impairment but in reality does not possess the impairment 
is protected by the Act.7l The court then addressed the misdi&gnosis of the boy 
and ruled that the Act would apply because the boy's history and misclassification 
of having AIDS unjustifiably served as the basis of the exclusion order.72 The 
school boards feared the risk of transmission of the disease to non-infected 
63 Id. at 382. 
64 130 Misc.2d 398,502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1986). 
65 [d. at 401, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 328. 
66 [d. 
67 [d. at 402, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 329. 
68 [d. 
69 [d. at 402-403, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 329-30. 
70 [d. at 414-15, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336. 
7l [d. at 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336. The court also addressed the equal 
protection problem on two levels: 1) excluding those with AIDS but not those 
with ARC or carriers of the virus, and 2) excluding those known infected and not 
excluding those who are infected but not known. [d. at 414-17, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 
337-8. 
72 [d. at 415, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37. 
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individuals. The court in recognizing the fear indicated that all of the witnesses 
for both the school boards and the City of New York concluded that the disease 
cannot be spread through casual contact with a person infected.7s 
In School Board oj Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, the United States 
Supreme Court was faced with whether a person who had a contagious disease 
(tuberculosis) was an individual with a handicap and thus protected by the Act.74 
The Court stated that section 504 was enacted to combat discrimination against 
the handicapped.75 The amendments to the definition of a handicapped person 
indicate that Congress intended for the Act to apply to persons who· were 
perceived as having a handicap when they in fact did not.76 This lends support 
to the position that those perceived as having AIDS or being infected are 
handicapped within the Act. 
Arline was a teacher who had experienced recurring episodes of acute 
tuberculosis and was released from employment at the end of the 1978-79 school 
year because of her potential contagiousness.77 She suffered from tuberculosis 
twice in 1978.78 The Court held that Arline suffered from a record of impairment 
which substantially limited her major life activities.79 Arline's tuberculosis 
affected her respiratory system, thereby creating a physiological disorder which 
met the criteria of a physical impairment.8o Hospitalization to care for the 
respiratory impairment was a substantial limitation of her major life activities.81 
The Court held that the effect of tuberculosis upon Arline could not be separated 
from the risk of contagiousness to others because both proceeded from the same 
condi tion. 82 
Section 504 was designed to encompass both the person with the impairment 
and his impact on other persons affected by the impairment.8s Arline was a 
7S [d. at 403-408, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 330-332. 
74 107 S.Ct. 1123 (1987). 
75 [d. at 1126-27. 
76 [d. 
77 [d. at 1125. 
78 [d. 
79 [d. at 1127. 
80 [d. 
81 [d. 
82 [d. at 1128-29. 
8S [d. at 1128. 
11 
person with a record of physical impairment and thus an individual with a 
handicap within the meaning of section 504. The fear of contagion on its own as 
the basis of the discriminatory action is still not justified in the light of the 
Act.8• The Court left to the district court the determination of whether Arline 
was otherwise qualified to be a teacher within the meaning of section 504.86 
From these cases, the courts will construe victims on the AIDS spectrum as 
having a handicap within meaning of the Act. 
PART IV 
Why consider whether the Act applies to persons with AIDS, ARC, or who are 
carriers of the virus, or who are perceived as being infected with AIDS? Victims 
of the AIDS epidemic are human beings. Just as discrimination on the basis of 
age, seX, religion, or ethnicity is not to be tolerated so then discrimination based 
upon a handicap should not be tolerated.86 Persons are justifiably excluded when 
a substantial risk to others exists and reasonable accommodation cannot be made 
to prevent exposure of others to the infected person. 
In the case of AIDS, casual contact in the workplace does not meet the 
substantial risk criteria. The nature of the disease and transmission modes argue 
against being infected via casual contact. Experts overwhelmingly conclude that 
the AIDS virus cannot be transmitted through casual contact. Additionally, AIDS 
and ARC victims suffer a physical impairment while those with AIDS, ARC, or the 
virus or those perceived as having AIDS suffer stigma from people. 
Misunderstanding and fear of the unknown are the impetus behind the 
discriminatory motives and attitudes. Without an awareness of the disease and its 
8. [d. at 1129. 
Allowing discrimination based on the con-
tagious effects of a physical impairment 
would be inconsistent with the basic purpose 
of Sec. 504, which is to ensure that handicapped 
individuals are not denied jobs or other 
benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes 
or the ignorance of others. [d. 
85 [d. at 1130-31. 
86 Washington Post, June 3, 1988, at Al & A14. 
Watkins [Chairman of the Presidential 
Commission of the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus Epidemic] emphasized that he re-
gards civil rights protection as essential 
to curbing the spread of AIDS because 
"it is the most significant obstacle to 
progress," a statement he said was expressed 
by dozens of witnesses who recounted 
their own experiences of those AIDS 
patients with whom they worked. [d. 
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modes of transmission, society will isolate and deny AIDS victims the chance for 
meaningful participation in society. 
CONCLUSION 
One avenue of protection for persons with AIDS, ARC, HTLV-III or who are 
perceived as having AIDS is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Section 504 prevents 
discrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped persons in programs 
receiving federal financial assistance. Statutory analysis and case law suggests 
that those persons are handicapped within the meaning of the statute. This is 
just one avenue of protection against discrimination in the workplace. Without 
avenues of protection for individuals with AIDS, ARC, or the virus or protection 
for those perceived to have AIDS, discriminatory attitudes fueled by 
misinformation, myths, and fear will deny those persons employment opportunities 
and meaningful participation in society. 
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ENFORCEMENT OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISIONS 
IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS IN CASES OF MUTUAL DELAY 
BY OWNERS AND CONTRACTORS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
Gyms, Inc., a hypothetical Virginia construction company, contracts with a 
local government to build a public gymnasium. Pursuant to the contract, Gyms is 
to construct the facility and to install all wall mats, basketball hoops, gym bars, 
game clocks and other necessary equipment. Gyms also assuines responsibility for 
landscaping of the facility, pa~ing of an auxiliary parking lot, and other jobs 
related to construction of the facility, but which are not absolutely necessary for 
its opening. The parties execute a ISO-page contract which, along with its other 
provisions, states that time is of the essence and provides for liquidated damages 
to be asS'essed for each day completion is delayed beyond a specified date. Work 
is commenced by Gyms upon receipt of an order to proceed, and four' months 
later, on the specified completion date, the finished facility is turned over to the 
government owner. A typical situation? Not at all. 
Even a hypothetical owner and contractor are likely to be subjected to delays 
caused by inclement weather, unavailability of supplies, scheduling difficulties, and 
a number of other potential complications. When the owner is solely responsible 
for the delay, the contractor will usually seek an extension for completion. It 
may also recover financial losses resulting from any unreasonable delay on the 
part of the owner in court.1 If the delay is instead caused by the contractor or 
its agents, the government will assess liquidated damages for each day's delay. 
Yet in this hypothetical, as is often the case in reality, both parties have 
contributed to the delay in completion. The government's delay is in providing 
the game clocks, which can be installed in one day but must be in place for the 
facility to host basketball games. Gyms, while waiting for the clocks, proceeds 
with the paving and landscaping for 60 days past the completion date, at which 
time the clocks arrive and are installed. 
Should the government be allowed to enforce its contractual remedy for 
damages due to the delay in completion of landscaping and paving, or ,should the 
time provision of the contract be nullified? If the time provision of the contract 
is negated, should Gyms be allowed a reasonable amount of time to complete its 
work on the clocks following the government's delay, leaving the government to 
prove actual damages for any recovery it seeks? More specifically, this article 
will discuss whether the local government can recover anything when both parties 
are at fault and when the delay of a contractor such as Gyms, though sizeable 
1 Atlantic Coast Line R. v. A. M Walkup Co., Inc., 132 Va. 386, 390, 112 
S.E. 663, 664 (1922). 
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when compared with the government's, did not prevent the facility from opening 
and thus caused no actual damages. 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
In construction contracts, a provision granting liquidated damages for each 
day's delay is an appropriate means of inducing performance or of providing 
compensation when either party fails to perform.2 Parties may properly contract 
for such a provision when actual damages at the time of the agreement are 
uncertain and difficult to measure. The courts will enforce the provision unless 
damage~. at the time of breach are susceptible of definite measurement (as in 
breach of an agreement to pay money) or when the stipulated amount would be 
grossly in excess of actual damages. As in any type of contract, the focus is on 
the intent of the parties as evidenced by the entire contract, and by t~e 
circumstances under which the contract was made.s As long as the amount 
designated as liquidated damages is a reasonable expression of the parties' intent 
at the time of the contract, the fact that no. actual damages are ultimately 
suffered by the contractee is irrelevant:' 
Construction contracts such as that between the hypothetical parties above are 
precisely the types of contracts where liquidated damages provisions are best 
used. Given the number and variety of duties assigned to the contractor, 
potential actual damages are incapable of being precisely ascertained at the time 
the contract is made. The liquidated damages provision, by setting a fixed rate 
of compensation, serves as an estimate of damages which would be sustained by 
the owner regardless of the nature of a delay, rather than as a means of 
compensating for the breach of a particular component of the contract. 
Viewed in this light, a provision allowing the withholding of an amount which 
is not disproportionate to the probable (rather. than actual) loss due to a 
contractor's delay will not be construed as an invalid penalty and is enforceable 
as liquidated damages.5 Where, however, the contractor's delay is not the sole 
delay, an amount that wouJd ordinarily be considered an appropriate measure of 
damages may be deemed unacceptable. 
2 Robinson v. United States, 261 U.S. 486, 488 (1923). 
S Taylor v. Sanders, 233 Va. 73, 75, 353 S.E.2d 745, 746-47 (1987). 
Although this is a real estate case, the real estate and construction industries are 
similar in this respect. 
4 See Robinson v. United States, 261 U.S. at 488. 
5 Taylor v. Sanders, 233 Va. at 76, 353 S.E.2d at 747. 
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MAJORITY VIEW: THE ROLE OF NONAPPORTIONMENT 
There are two lines of opinion on the issue of whether a liquidated damages 
provision may be enforced when both the owner and the contractor contribute to 
a delay in construction. Under the majority view, an owner who has caused a 
substantial delay in the beginning or progress of work without agreeing to an 
extension is prohibited from claiming liquidated damages, even if the contractor is 
also responsible for the delay.6 
In United States v. United Engineering & Contracting Co. 7, a contractor who 
had accepted a reduced payment under protest was able to recover liquidated 
damages withheld by the government after showing that much of the delay in its 
construction of a building had been caused by delays in the completion of 
surrounding buildings by other contractors hired by the government. The court 
. -
refused to apportion the owner's and contractor's delay and held that since the 
government had prevented performance of the contract within the stipulated time, 
even though the work was also delayed through the fault of the contractor, 
liquidated damages were waived, and the government could recover only proven 
actual damages.8 
The following language of the court's opinion states the oft-quoted "rule of 
nonapportionment" now applied by many states and lower federal courts: 
We think the better rule is that when the contractor has agreed to do a piece 
of work within a given time and the parties have stipulated a fixed sum as 
" liquidated damages not wholly disproportionate to the loss for each day's delay, 
in order to enforce such payment the other party must not prevent the 
performance of the contract within the stipulated time, and that where such is 
the case, and thereafter the work is completed though delayed by the fault of 
the contractor, the rule of the original contract cannot be insisted upon, and 
liquidated damages measured thereby are waived.9 
In adopting this rule, the court was influenced by the fact that supplemental 
agreements between the government and United Engineering during the course of 
construction made no reference to liquidated damages. lO Some lower courts have 
interpreted the rule more broadly on the theory that the parties' mutual delays 
place the date of completion beyond the term of the contract. Because courts 
must be able to fix the day from which a liquidated damages clause is to apply, it 
6 Annotation, Liability of Building or Construction 
Liquidated Damages for Breach of Time Limit Where Work 
Contractee or Third Person, 152 A.L.R. 1349, 1359-60 (1944). 
7 234 U.S. 236 (1914). 
8 [d. at 242. 
9 [d. 
10. [d. 
16 
Contractor for 
is Delayed by 
is claimed, apportionment cannot be made where no definite date for completion 
remains.ll In any event, the owner is again relegated to proving actual damages. 
THE MINORITY VIEW: APPORTIONMENT ALLOWED 
Where a contract contains an explicit time extension provision, most courts 
will assume that the parties intended an apportionment of responsibility for delay 
to be made, and will allow the owner to recover a liquidated sum for the period 
of delay attributable to the contractor.12 Under the minority view, apportionment 
is permitted even where no contractual provision for time extensions has been 
made. A delay caused by the owner does not necessarily discharge the forfeiture 
clause but only entitles the contractor to a credit against his period of default 
(in a sense, an automatic extension).13 
The primary authority for the rule permitting apportionment is Robinson v. 
United States. 1" In Robinson, the contractor, relying on United Engineering, 
argued that because the government had caused some of the delay in construction, 
the liquidated damages provision was unenforceable. The court, however, 
distinguished United Engineering, in stating that, but for the government's action 
in that case, the contractor's work would have been completed within the 
contract period.16 Because the contractor in Robinson had agreed to pay at a 
specified rate for each day's delay not caused by the government, the court found 
that a clear intent was shown for the contractor to pay for some days' delay, 
even if relieved from paying for other delays because of the government's action. 
As a result, the government did recover liquidated damages for the days of delay 
attributable to the contractor.16 
APPORTIONMENT/NONAPPORTIONMENT IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
In the Fourth Circuit, case law both supports and limits the rule of 
nonapportionment. Because the circuit's mutual delay decisions were all made 
prior to United Engineering and Robinson, it is unclear how these later cases may 
have affected the state of the law in Virginia. In Jefferson Hotel Co. v. 
11 Annotation. supra note 6, at 1364-65. 
12 Cushman, Ficken & Sneed, Delays and Disruptions, in CONSTRUCTION 
LITIGATION 123 (R. Cushman ed. 1981). 
13 Annotation, supra note 6, at 1369. 
14 261 U.S. 486 (1923). 
16 [d. at 489. 
16 [d. at 488. 
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Brumbaugh,17 the court did not require a general contractor to pay a contract 
penalty of $150 per day of delay beca use indepe~den t con tractors hired by the 
owner had contributed to the delay. Though the hotel company urged that its 
contractors had only been responsible fora few days' delay, the court refused to 
apportion their delay with that of the general contractor. The court held that 
the general contractor, as a builder, was entitled to work in an undisturbed, 
systematic manner and that the court· could not know, months later, what 
conditions had contributed to the overall delay, so it would not attempt to 
apportion the delay.ls 
In Caldwell & Drake v.· Schmulbach,19 a case decided shortly after Jefferson 
Hotel, the court, relying on that decision, refused to apportion the delay between 
an owner ~nd contractor, even though the parties' contract expressly provided for 
apportionment. The causes of delay in construction of a building included 
difficulty of access to the construction site, which was hemmed in by surrounding 
buildings, necessity of protecting the buildings adjoining the site, and most 
notably, a set of architectural plans which provided for a building larger than the 
lot on which it was to be constructed. According to the court, these 
circumstances demonstrated clearly the impossibility of a court's attempting to 
determine and apportion the cause of de<lay between an owner and contractor 
when both were in default. Consequently, no private contract by its terms could 
change the law prohibiting apportionment or could compel a court to do so.20 
Jefferson Hotel and Caldwell & Drake appear to indicate a general adherence 
to the rule of nonapportionment in the fourth circuit. Indeed, both cases are 
currently referenced as authority supporting that rUle.21 The decision in Caldwell 
& Drake, however, was modified on appeal in Schmulbach v. Caldwell,22 where, 
rather than focusing on the difficulties a court might have in apportioning mutual 
delay, the court emphasized the parties' agreement that the contractor would pay 
$50 per day in liquidated damages for delays not caused by inclement weather or 
the owner. The court distinguished Jefferson Hotel. where the payment for each 
day's delay was designated in the contract as a penalty, stating that. where 
parties had provided for a stipulated sum as liquidated damages, courts should 
17 168 F. 867 (4th Cir. 1909). 
IS [d. at 874-75. 
19 175 F. 429 (C.C.N.D. W.Va. 1909). 
20 [d. at 434. 
21 See 17A c.J.S. Contracts Sec. 502(4)(a) (1963). 
22 196 F. 16, 28 (4th Cir. 1912). 
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give effect to their intent by not holding the amount to be a penalty or refusing 
to enforce the contract provision.23 
In further attempting to distinguish Jefferson Hotel, the court pointed out that 
whereas the cour.t in Jefferson Hotel had found it impossible to separate mutual 
delays, here the parties had provided for a means of apportionment in the 
contract. Regarding this issue, the court said: 
[W]e are not aware of any principle of law, which prevents or relieves the 
court from apportioning the delays when, either by competent and satisfactory 
evidence, or by a contractual standard fixed by the parties, they can do so 
with reasonable certainty.24 (emphasis added). 
Because the owner could show the number of days for which he was entitled 
to liquidated damages and could point to a contract requiring the defaulting party 
to share the number of days for which he was entitled to be credited, 
nonapportionment was inapplicable.26 
The contractual language in Schmulbach (providing the contractor with a credit 
for days "when the weather forbids work" and "for each. and every day he is 
delayed by the owner")26 makes that agreement closely analogous to contracts 
explicitly providing for time extensions, which do not come under the rule of 
non apportionment. However, based on the court's reference to consideration of 
evidence establishing responsibility for delay (as opposed to the parties' 
contractual standard), it would seem that whenever the impossibility of 
apportioning delay is not at issue (either because the parties have provided a 
means of apportionment, as in Schmulbach, or because the delays attributable to 
each party are easily separated, as in the Gyms hypothetical), it would not be 
inherently unfair for a court to apply a forfeiture clause, stipulated in advance by 
the parties, to the contractor's portion of the delay.27 
Coal & Iron Ry. v. Reherd28 indicates still another circumstance under which a 
Fourth Circuit court may be willing to allow apportionment. In Reherd, though 
the parties' contract did not expressly provide for a time extension where the 
owner's actions interfered with timely completion, the court found that because 
the contract conferred on the owner the authority to require additional work by 
23 Id. at 25-26. 
24 [d. at 27. 
26 [d. 
26 [d. at 18. 
27 [d. at 27. 
28 204 F. 859 (4th Cir. 1913). 
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the contractor, the parties' consent to a reasonable extension of time for 
completing the extra work could be implied.29 
Under the implied extension rationale, fault for any delay beyond the 
reasonable period necessary to complete the extra work was attributed to the 
contractor. The court held that though the owner had increased the work, which 
would necessarily require more time, when a reasonable time had elapsed for the 
contractor to complete the increased work, it would be liable in liquidated 
damages for delays beyond that reasonable limit of time.so Thus, relying on its 
interpretation of the parties' agreement and intent, the court allowed enforcement 
of the forfeiture clause, even though specific provision for time extensions had 
not been made and the owner's actions had contributed to the delay. 
COMPETING POLICIES 
Though the more recent decision of Robinson v. United States can be read as 
limiting the instances in which a court refuses to apportion damages to situations 
such as that in United States v. United Engineering & Contracting Co. (where the 
contractor would have completed construction as scheduled had the owner's agents 
not caused an intervening delay), many courts continue to adhere to a general 
rule of nonapportionment. The policies that support the rule involved arise from 
unique aspects of the construction industry. Delay in one part of construction 
usually disturbs the whole, the length of an interruption does not necessarily 
correspond to the resulting delay, and complicated evidence makes it difficult to 
separate the delays attributable to each party.Sl The certainty, apparent 
evenhanded treatment of owner and contractor, and ease of application of the 
nonapportionment rule make it attractive from an administrative point of view.s2 
Nevertheless, the practical effect of a refusal to apportion delay, granting the 
contractor an extension of time for completion but denying him any monetary 
recovery for the delay, while at the same time precluding the owner from 
collecting liquidated damages for late completion, may result in injustice to both 
parties.ss If the government in the Gyms hypothetical had failed to inspect the 
building for two months, which in turn prevented the contractor from proceeding 
with additional phases in the construction process, Gyms, though perhaps grateful 
for an exemption from paying liquidated damages for any delay on its part, might 
29 [d. at 880. 
so !d. at 881. 
SI Annotation, supra note 6, at 1376-77. 
S2 Phillips, Stetson, Bramble, Construction Disputes and Time, in ISSUES 
IN CONSTRUCTION LAW 49, 65 (1988). 
SS. [d. 
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find that exemption wholly disproportionate to its losses over the two-month 
waiting period. 
A better solution would be to grant Gyms an implied extension and to allow it 
to present a claim for "extra work" as in Coal & Iron Ry. v. Reherd. On the 
other hand, if, as in the original hypothetical, Gyms were responsible for two 
months' delay in performing one part of the contract (the landscaping and 
paving), while the government defaulted with respect to a part of the contract 
which in no way affected Gyms' ability to landscape and pave, which required 
only one half day's work, and which, had Gyms not also been in default, would 
probably have been excused altogether,S4 it would be unfair to allow Gyms to 
capitalize on the government's inability to obtain clocks by refusing to uphold the 
forfeiture clause. 
In addition to the equitable considerations supporting apportionment, there are 
practical reasons for allowing the parties' contractual provisions for damages to 
stand. First, improvements in methods of scheduling analysis and the detail of 
critical path management have made allocation of responsibility for delay less 
difficult than it may have been when the rule against apport 
ionment was being developed.55 An increased faith in the ability of triers of fact 
to sort out complicated evidence also weighs in favor of allocation. 
Finally, there is the liquidated damages provision itself. In the Gyms 
hypothetical, the parties, at the time the contract was made, agreed to a 
liquidated sum as a measure of potential actual damages which could not otherwise 
be ascertained. Though the rationale behind the refusal of many courts to 
enforce liquidated damages provisions in cases of mutual delay may be that such 
provisions act as a penalty,56 the fact remains that if a claim is for measured or 
liquidated damages expressly agreed upon by the parties to be compensation for 
potential actual damages, the principles involved regarding the enforcement of 
penalties do not apply.57 
It would be inconsistent for a court to rule that an owner who has contributed 
to construction delay is allowed to recover actual damages, only to ignore the 
owner's (and contractor's) provision for those damages. Today, when 
construction contracts cover hundreds of facets of a given project, are thoroughly 
negotiated by both sides, and are deliberately designed to protect both owner and 
54 Reid v. Field, 83 Va. 26, I S.E. 395 (1887). A contractee is entitled to 
accept less than full performance, and the government would have done so itt the 
interests of avoiding unnecessary expense. 
55 Phillips, Stetson, Bramble, supra note 32, at 66. 
36 Annotation, supra note 6, at 1378. 
37 Schmulbach v. Caldwell, 196 F. 16,25-26 (4th Cir. 1912). 
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contractor from unpredictable events, there is no reason to sacrifice the parties' 
freedom to address problems of mutual delay in the interests of judicial economy 
and adherence to an archaic rule of law. 
22 
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS V. LIPSCOMB: 
TIGHTENING THE GRIP ON VIRGINIA PUBLISHERS 
The United States Supreme Court recently declined to hear an appeal of a 1987 
Virginia Supreme Court case which held that a public school teacher is not a 
public official for the purpose of invoking the New York Times malice rule l in 
defamation cases. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, the Virginia court 
said the public has no independent interest in Lipscomb's qualifications and 
performance "beyond its general interest in the qualifications and performance of 
all government employees," and therefore she was not a public official but rather 
a private person.2 
The court noted the lack of any federal case on the question, and a split in 
the state court holdings. Federal constitutional law determines who is a public 
official. State courts must determine public official status in accordance with 
"the purpose of a national constitutional protection," and therefore state law tests 
are not determinative on the question.s 
This. article analyzes the court's finding in Lipscomb that a public school 
teacher is not a public officiaL It also compares Lipscomb with other federal and 
state court decisions on the public official question. The article illustrates that 
this part of the Lipscomb decision missed the key components of the test for 
public official status, such as the breadth of the leading definition of a public 
official, the impact of public education on government, and the access a teacher 
has to media remedies. 
F ACTS OF LIPSCOMB 
Lipscomb centered around a newspaper article written for the Richmond Times-
Dispatch by Charles Cox. In a front-page article published a few weeks before 
the start of school in the fall of 1981, Cox questioned the qualifications of 
1 A suit for defamation provides an avenue of legal r~dress for invasions 
of an individual's interest in reputation and good name. To recover damages a 
plaintiff must prove the defamatory comments injured his reputation and impaired 
his standing among his peers. Thus an essential consideration in any defamation 
action is the status of the plaintiff. Whether a court deems a person to be a 
private individual or a public figure is of paramount importance in such actions 
because public figures alleging defamation must prove the defendant published 
the defamatory comments with actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth. 
Private individuals carry no such onerous burden. Note, Waldbaum v. Fairchild 
Publications, Inc.: Giving Objectivity to the Definition of Public Figures, 30 
Cath.U.L.Rev. 307, 308 (1981). 
2 234 Va. 277, 287, 362 S.E.2d 32, 37 (1987) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 
383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966», cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1997 (1988). 
S Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966). The case held that a 
supervisor of a ski resort who was employed by and directly responsible to county 
commissioners was a public official for purposes of federal constitutional 
protection purposes. 
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Vernelle Lipscomb, a teacher at Thomas Jefferson High School in Richmond. The 
article included quotes from Lipscomb's colleagues, students and parents of 
students criticizing Lipscomb's teaching abilities, particularly when dealing with 
bright or honors program students. Cox was alerted to the problem by a parent of 
one of Lipscomb's students. The parent had previously approached the school 
administration and attempted to have Lipscomb removed. When this failed the 
parent contacted Cox and told him about the situation. At the time, no open 
conflict existed at the high school, but numerous complaints were on record 
regarding Lipscomb. The front-page article provided very little refutation of the 
negative statements. Lipscomb and other school officials had been contacted for 
comment, but the school board attorney advised them against discussing the 
details of the complaint against the teacher. Conflicting lines of testimony were 
presented at the ensuing defamation trial with regard to Lipscomb's 
qualifications.4 
Prior to Lipscomb, the Supreme Court of Virginia had held that a university 
professor does not occupy a position of such persuasive power and influence that 
he could be deemed a public figure for all purposes.5 In Lipscomb, the court 
broadened the scope of the state's defamation remedy by ruling that a teacher is 
not a public official, leaving designation as a "limited purpose" or "vortex" public 
figure6 the only way in which an educator could qualify for New York Times 
actual malice.7 
4 Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 283. Lipscomb sued the newspaper, the publisher 
and the reporter, and was awarded $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and 
$45,000 in punitive damages by a jury. The trial judge sustained the jury's award 
of $45,000 in punitive damages but required a remittitur of $900,000 of the 
compensatory damages. Id. 
5 Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981). Moore took out 
an advertisement in a local newspaper that accused Fleming of being a racist. 
Moore was a realtor and his actions were in reference to some property 
development that Fleming had invested in. The court said the words probably did 
not have an effect on Fleming in his profession as a teacher, and thus were not 
defamatory per se. 
6 A limited purpose or "vortex" public figure is far more common than the 
"general purpose" public figure. The designation is comprised of those individuals 
who voluntarily inject themselves into a particular public controversy and thereby 
assume a role of special prominence in the affairs of society and therefore invite 
attention and comment. Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
7. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Times published 
an advertisement that was challenged as maliciously defamatory of a city 
commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the 
statements in the advertisement were libelous per se, false, and not privileged, 
and that the evidence showed malice on the part of the newspaper. The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that there was a qualified privilege for honest misstatements 
of fact, defeasible only upon a showing of actual malice. 
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The court disposed of the public official Question summarily, relying on the 
Gertz8 arguments to conclude that a public school teacher is not a public official. 
The court, citing Gertz, reasoned that a teacher does not have access to channels 
of effective communication and hence does not have an opportunity to counteract 
potentially false or defamatory statements, thus making a teacher more like a 
private citizen than a public official and more in need of government protection.9 
The court cited the Virginia Code,tO which prohibits disclosing student names and 
records, as one barrier to effective communication. 
Following the reasoning of Gertz, one part of the test for a public official is 
whether, in view of his employment position, an official ran "the risk of closer 
public scrutiny" than might otherwise be the case. 11 The court acknowledged this 
was true for a public school teacher, but felt this point did not outweigh the 
other factors in the final decision. Particularly influential to the court's decision 
was Lipscomb's lack of access to channels of effective communication and the 
lack of a controversy at the time the newspaper article was published. 
The court found that the criticism of Lipscomb came as a result of her 
performance as a teacher, not as temporary head of Jefferson High School's 
English department. She did not attempt to influence or control any public affair 
or school policy. The court focused on the question of whether her position as a 
schoolteacher was one that would invite public scrutiny and public discussion.12 
Finally, the Times-Dispatch article was one that created a controversy rather than 
reported on one that already existed. The employee's position was not inviting 
8 Gertz concerned a libelous article appearing in a magazine called 
American Opinion, a monthly publication of the John Birch Society. The article 
in question discussed whether the prosecution of a policeman in Chicago was part 
of a communist campaign to discredit local law enforcement agencies. The 
magazine alleged that Gertz was the chief architect of the "frame-up" of the 
police officer and linked him to Communist activity. Gertz was working for the 
plaintiff in a related civil suit. The Supreme Court held he was neither a public 
official nor a public figure. The court rejected the defendant's "de facto" public 
official argument and decided the question based on the attorney's lack of access 
to effective reply in the media. The court also based its decision on Gertz' 
failure to thrust himself into the vortex of any public issue or to seek the 
limelight in any meaningful way. 
9 Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 285, 362 S.E.2d at 36 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 
418). 
to Va. Code Sec. 22.1-287(A) provides in pertinent part: 
"No teacher, principal or employee of any public school nor any school 
board member shall permit access to any written records concerning any particular 
pupil enrolled in the school in any class to any person except under judicial 
process .... " 
11 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
12 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87 n.13. 
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public scrutiny and discussion, but rather because discussion was occasioned by 
the particular charges against Lipscomb, public official designation was 
inappropriate. IS 
BACKGROUND DECISIONS 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,14 the United States Supreme Court 
introduced the concept of the public official whose privacy interest would have to 
partially yield to the public interest to further free and open debate on issues of 
general public concern. Under the Times standard, public criticism of a public 
official's public conduct is constitutionally protected from defamation liability 
absent clear and convincing proof16 that the defendant acted with "actual 
malice."16 
In New York Times, the Supreme Court intentionally left the boundaries of 
what constitutes a "public official" an open question.17 Two years later the 
Court again addressed the question in Rosenblatt v. Baer.18 The Court 
established that persons in either of the following two situations could fit the 
public official definition, thus triggering the New York Times malice standard: 
(I) " ... at the very least ... those among the hierarchy of government 
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental 
affairs." or 
(2) "Where a position in government has such apparent importance 
that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications 
and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general 
public interest in the qualifications 
and performance of all government employees ... ."19 
The Rosenblatt decision determined that the focus must be on the nature of 
the public employee's function and the public's particular concern with the 
employee's work. The case, however, did not provide a clear demarcation between 
public officials and mere public employees. The Court again left unclear to which 
government employees the public official designation extended. 
n.13). 
IS Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 287, 362 S.E.2d at 37 (citing Gertz, 383 U.S. at 87 
14 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
16 [d. at 285-86. 
16 [d. at 279-80. 
17 The Court had no occasion "to determine how far down into the lower 
ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation would extend ... " [d. 
at 283 n.23. 
18 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
19 [d. at 85, 86. 
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In 1967, the Supreme Court said that public figures would also be subject to 
the New York Times malice rule.20 Like the public official, the public figure 
" ... commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient access to the 
means of counterargument to be able to 'expose through discussion the falsehoods 
and fallacies'"21 voiced against him or her. A public figure designation could be 
achieved through the status of one's position in society, or by "thrusting 
... [oneself] into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy ... ."22 
The expansion of First Amendment protection under the public official and 
public figure doctrines reached its peak in 1971 with Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. 
lnc. 23 A plurali ty24 of the Supreme Court said that regardless of whether the 
plaintiff was a public or private citizen, his involvement in a matter of public or 
general concern was sufficient to trigger the New York Times knowing and 
reckless falsity standard for defamation. Two years later in Gertz, the Supreme 
Court began to withdraw some of these First Amendment freedoms by narrowing 
the working definition of a public official. Rather than focusing solely on the 
question of whether the matter exposed to media attention was a valid public 
concern as New York Times and· Rosenblatt did, the Gertz decision said that 
public official decisions had to balance this First Amendment concern against the 
privacy interests of the individual, and the individual's ability to respond to false 
or misleading statements made about them. In the opinion of the Court, "[t]he 
'public or general interest' test for determining the applicability of the New York 
Times standard to private defamation actions inadequately serves both of the 
competing values at stake."25 
The law as it stands today allows room for both the Gertz and Rosenblatt 
rationales. While in Hutchinson v. Proxmire26 the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated 
its movement away from the pure "responsibility or control over government 
20 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
21 ld. at 155 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting». 
22 ld. 
23 403 U.S. 29 (1971) 
24 Justice Brennan wrote the plurality oplDlon joined by Burger and 
Blackmun. Justices Black and White each wrote a separate concurrence. Justice 
Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Marshall which was joined by 
Justice Stewart. Justice Douglas did not take part in the decision. 
25 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. 
26 443 U.S. III (1979). 
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affairs"27 test, in Virginia, "the Rosenblatt characterization of a New York Times 
public official has not been modified and in our view fits well into the framework 
of competing values created by libel litigation."28 
VIRGINIA 
In Lipscomb, the Supreme Court of Virginia focused primarily on the self-help 
doctrine: the idea that society will allow more potentially damaging discussion 
about public officials in part because of their enhanced ability to contradict lies 
or correct errors by their greater access to the media. The conclusion that 
Lipscomb did not have access to the media is contrary to the facts of the case. 
If Lipscomb's professional conduct as a schoolteacher was noteworthy enough to 
be published on the front page of the Richmond Times-Dispatch, the teacher had 
viable ac~ess to that medium. The court in Lipscomb is primarily concerned that 
the avenue for expression be a two-way street, yet the underlying facts show that 
this was the case. Because the institution of public education is being 
scrutinized, media interest is assured. For instance, had Lipscomb made a 
statement that her students were exceptionally belligerent, or made any other 
reference to her job which indicated that things were out of the ordinary, that 
would have been "news" also, and would have merited coverage in the newspaper. 
The Virginia Supreme Court also reasoned that Lipscomb was barred from 
effectively replying to criticism because of a statute in the Virginia Code.29 The 
court assumes that if Lipscomb were to defend her teaching reputation, she would 
need to disclose official records of students in her class, an act forbidden under 
the Code. There are three problems with this reasoning. First, equally effective 
options existed for Lipscomb to defend herself. At the trial there were students, 
teachers and school administrators who testified in contradiction of the complaints 
about Lipscomb,so so certainly there were reliable people available whom Lipscomb 
could have referred Cox to in order to contradict the defamatory statements Cox 
had recorded. 
Secondly, the Virginia court misapplied the test for a public official. They 
focused on the individual circumstances of Lipscomb's case, and not the position 
of school teachers in general. When deciding whether a person is a public figure 
it is appropriate to delve into the particular circumstances surrounding the alleged 
defamatory statements. However, when deciding whether a person is a public 
official, the court should look at the employment position in a generic sense, and 
27 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. 75 at 85-86. 
28 Arctic Co., Ltd., v. Loudoun Times Mirror, 624 F.2d 518, 521 (4th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981). 
29 See supra, note 10. 
so Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 283, 362 S.E.2d at 35. 
28 
not add in factors such as Lipscomb's ability to respond to specific charges.A 
person seeking government office "runs the risk of closer public scrutiny."31 It 
is self evident that a person whose job entails trying to influence scores of young 
men and women on a daily basis is going to be scrutinized by those persons, their 
families and their peers. 
Perhaps the strongest refutation of this "inhibited access" theory adopted by 
the Virginia Supreme Court in Lipscomb comes from an earlier Virginia case, 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, in which the U.S. Supreme Court, on 
appeal from the Virginia Supreme Court, said the fact that judges traditionally do 
not respond to media reports and public commentary did not give them any 
greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions.32 
The Supreme Court of Virginia mentions the fact that Lipscomb was not an 
elected official. This should not have had any bearing on the outcome of the 
question.33 The general public's right to vote for the official is dispositive of 
neither of the two criteria from Rosenblatt, apparent importance in government 
and heightened interest in job performance.34 Appointed officials ranging from the 
executive cabinet to police officers3s fit comfortably in the Rosenblatt definition 
of a public official. This is an example of the court's application of public figure 
reasoning to a public official question. 
The determinative question in the public figure analysis is whether the person 
makes a conscious effort to seek out the limelight. A person campaigning for36 
31 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
32 435 U.S. 829, 838-9 (1978). Landmark focused on a Virginia statute 
which enacted criminal sanctions against any person publishing information about 
proceedings before a state judicial review commission hearing complaints about 
judges' disabilities or misconduct. The U.S. Supreme Court said that in general 
the operation of the judiciary, and in specific the conduct of judges, is a matter 
of utmost public concern. This analysis leads to a similar conclusion that 
complaints about a teacher's qualifications necessarily are a matter of public 
concern and protected speech because they have a direct bearing on the operation 
of public education. 
33 
"There has been no showing that Lipscomb, who was not an elected 
officiaL." Lipscomb, 234 Va. at 286, 362 S.E.2d at 37. 
34 383 U.S. at 85-86. 
3S See True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 
So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984). Both of these courts rejected the public school teacher as 
a public official in part by distinguishing the position from a police officer. Both 
states have held a police officer to be a public official. 
36. For an example of the New York Times malice rule applied to the higher 
strata of elected officialdom, see Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) 
(candidate for democratic nomination for U.S. Senate), and at the lower end of 
the spectrum, Ocala Star Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (candidate for 
29 
or holding an elected office would obviously be striving to stay in the public eye. 
A public official does not necessarily have the same motivations. The court errS 
by asking how Lipscomb obtained her position of authority. 
The proper controlling question is whether the public acknowledges the job the 
official holds to be authoritative or influential. Under Gertz, public 
funding is relevant in deciding whether a government employee is a public 
official. Lipscomb did not mention the fact that the public school teacher was on 
the public payroll. While the question of whether an official receives public 
funds is not dispositive,S7 there is merit to the view that a threshold question to 
show public official status should be whether the position comes under the ambit 
of a government institution.s8 
ANALYSIS BY OTHER COURTS 
• 
As the Supreme Court of Virginia noted, there is a decided split in the state 
court holdings on this question. Other state courts have looked at the question 
in greater detail than did the Virginia court. Generally the courts that extend 
the public official doctrine to public school teachers rely on Rosenblatt (public 
debate should take precedence over privacy interest), while courts holding a 
teacher is not a public official emphasize the Gertz premise that privacy of the 
individual is superior. In the two decades since Rosenblatt, several cases have 
limited the scope of the public official doctrine, however.39 
The Supreme Court of Virginia did not value a teacher's impact on society as 
highly as the state cases coming to an opposite conclusion on the public official 
question. There is substantial sociological data affirming the impact of the 
schoolteacher on the citizenry.40 In Gallman v. Carnes,41 the Arkansas Supreme 
county tax assessor}. 
37 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. III (1979). 
38 Johnston v. Corinthian City Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978). 
39 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 119 n.8. The Supreme 
Court "has not provided precise boundaries for the category of 'public official'; it 
cannot be thought to include all public employees, however."; and Dun & 
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
40 Brennan noted the Court's repeated reference to public schools as "the 
Nation's most important institution in the preparation of individuals for 
participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our 
society rests." Brennan said the teacher plays a critical role in developing 
students' attitude toward government and understanding of the role of citizens in 
our society, and serves as a role model for students. See, e.g., Note, Aliens' 
Right to Teach: Political Socialization and Public Schools, 85 YALE L. J. 90, 99-
104 (I975). "With the family and the peer group, the school is recognized as a 
crucial agent of political socialization. A teacher's role in the process of political 
and cultural learning becomes critical because a teacher is quite often the first 
nonfamilial spokesman of society that a child regularly encounters, and functions 
30 
Court said newspaper articles could question the qualifications of a law school 
professor because education is a matter of general or public concern. The 
Arkansas holding is in direct. conflict with Lipscomb. There is little to 
distinguish the case from Lipscomb other than the fact that the courts came to 
opposite conclusions. 
In drawing the distinction that a teacher has very limited authority42 the 
courts again emphasize the "control" aspect of the definition and overlook the 
"substantial responsibility" part of the definition. A review of the language used 
by the courts that espouse this reasoning reveals an underlying premise that to 
meet the definition of public official a government employee must have the ability 
to assert direct, tangible control over the citizenry.43 This is simply not the 
case. A public official may be one who appears to have substantial responsibility 
for the conduct of government as well as private affairs.44 
DECISIONS CONTRARY TO LIPSCOMB 
State courts have mentioned a number of factors in holding a teacher to be a 
public official. In Gallman, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a facuIty 
dispute at a public institution was a matter of general public concern.46 Other 
in the classroom as Ii model for acceptable behavior and social attitudes." [d. at 
102-3 and "The public school teacher as an authority figure .. .is much more like a 
political authority ... The teacher, like the policeman, president, or mayor, is part 
of an institutional pattern, a constitutional order." [d. at 103 n.52 (quoting R. 
Dawson and K. Prewitt, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION (1969) at 158). 
41. 497 S.W.2d 47 (Ark. 1973). The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a 
law school professor was a public official for purposes of a news article that 
questioned his teaching abilities. The court said that a faculty dispute over the 
teacher's qualifications was properly an issue for public comment and therefore 
privileged. [d.' at 50 (quoting Clark v. McBane, 299 Mo. 77, 252 S.W.428 (1923». 
The court quoted Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (I 971), which 
extended the "constitutional protection to all discussion and communication 
involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to wh,ether the 
persons involved are famous or anonymous." [d. . 
42 True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d at 264. 
43 See, e.g., True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986) and Nodar v. 
Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984). 
44 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 85-86. 
46 497 S.W.2d at 50. Interestingly, the Arkansas court noted that the 
Supreme Court of Virginia had recently upheld a summary judgment' in recognizing 
that a faculty dispute at a state college constituted a subject of public and 
general concern. The Virginia case involved a faculty dispute at Virginia Western 
Community College. The Virginia court based its "public official" decision on the 
fact that there was open dispute between facuIty and administrators, rather than 
the general question of whether the position of college professor fit the public 
official definition, and the case is therefore not applicable to the present 
question. 
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relevant factors for some courts included the closeness of the teaching position to 
the electoral process,·6 and whether the position was publicly funded.·7 Another 
court has found that even a voluntary teaching position can qualify for public 
official status.·a The most prevalent rationale used by courts when holding a 
teacher to be a public official is to emphasize the social and political 
responsibilities incumbent upon the position in the community.·9 
.6 In Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (1978), the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that a teacher must show actual malice under New York 
Times and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. The court was persuaded by an Illinois 
case, Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 III.App.3d 889, 321 N.E.2d 739 (1974), later 
overruled in its state of origin by McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 III. App.3d 421, 54 
IlI.Dec. 913, 425 N.E.2d 1130 (1981). 
Basarich found it relevant that public school teachers were hired by the school 
board, an elected body, and were paid with public funds. Also, the court said the 
teaching occupation is a highly responsible position in the community and thus fit 
the Rosenblatt criteria for public official status. 
U Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (1978) . 
• a Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla.1978) 
involved a grade school physical education teacher and wrestling coach. The fact 
that Johnston was not paid for his work as a coach was not relevant, according 
to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, because Johnston was still working within the 
public school system, an obvious governmental function . 
• 9 Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986). The 
court borrowed language from the U.S. Supreme Court in saying that the public 
school teacher performs a task "that goes to the heart of representative 
government." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). The court also 
advanced the argument that as an authority figure for children, the teacher has a 
significant impact on the community. See also Johnston v. Corinthian City 
Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978). The court said it could "think of no 
higher community involvement touching more families and carrying more public 
interest than the public school system" and Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 
U.S. 953 (1985) (Brennan, dissenting). Brennan quoted from the newspaper 
column under question to accent his case for the importance of high school 
employees: 
"When a person takes on a job in a school, 
whether it be as a coach, administrator or even maintenance worker,it is well 
to remember that 
his primary job is that of educator. 
"There is scarcely a person concerned with 
school who doesn't leave his mark in some way on 
the young people who pass his way--many are the 
lessons taken away from school by students which 
weren't learned from a lesson plan or out of a 
book. They come from personal experiences with 
and observations of their superiors and peers, 
from watching actions and reactions." [d. at 955-56. 
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ST A TES IN ACCORD WITH LIPSCOMB 
Other courts have argued on policy grounds that making a teacher a public 
official would stifle creativity50 and have said a teacher's control is too remote 
to be authoritative. 51 Other courts have focused on the size of the audience 
served by the newspaper;52 asked whether the institution was a uniquely 
government affair;53 whether the position had any administrative or supervisory 
duties;54 whether it required any intrusion into the intimate details of daily 
lives;55 or whether the employees would reasonably be aware that they were 
forfeiting some privacy rights.56 Still other courts have asked whether the 
position is a highly visible one.57 
The policy-based argument in other states holding teachers to be private 
citizen diverges greatly from the Lipscomb reasoning. Implicit in the policy 
argument "is the concept of a freedom 'of the governed to question the governor, 
of those who are influenced by the operation of government to criticize those 
50 In Franklin v. Benevolent and Protective Order 
of Elks, Lodge 1108, 97 Cal.App.3d 915, 159 Cal.Rptr. 131 (1979), the California 
Supreme Court said that a rule making teachers public officials, and therefore 
remediless for all defamation excepting where actual malice is present, would 
stifle the teacher's expression and intellect and lead to less effective teaching. 
51 [d. The California court said that while a public school teacher invites 
public scrutiny and discussion, the policy behind the concept is to "allow the 
governed to question the governors," and the teacher's governing or control in 
the classroom is too remote and philosophical to qualify on those grounds. See 
also McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 I1I.App.3d 421, 54 III. Dec. 913, 425 N.E.2d 1130 
(1981); Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984). 
52 Johnson v. Board of Junior Colleges, 31 III.App.3d 270, 276 n.l, 334 
N.E.2d 442 n.1 (1975). The court held that the public figure status of a college 
professor was due to his actions during the controversy, and that the teacher was 
a public figure only for purposes of media that specifically served the school 
audience, in this case the college newspaper. In a later case the court further 
narrowed the circumstances where a teacher could be a public figure. 
McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 I1I.App.3d 421, 54 I1I.Dec. 913, 425 N.E.2d 1130 (1981). 
53 True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986). The state supreme court 
analysis consisted of distinguishing the public school teacher from a police 
detective, a position they had recently held to come under the public official 
doctrine. The court said that a detective is a public official because he is 
involved in law enforcement, and the duties of a law enforceinent official are a 
uniquely government affair. 
54 [d. 
55 [d. 
56 [d. 
57 Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984). 
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who control the conduct of government."58 The use of the word "control" in this 
argument is much stronger than the language of Rosenblatt, where the Supreme 
Court said there need be apparent control or substantial responsibility for the 
conduct of government affairs. 59 
The school teacher fits much better into the second category, substantial 
responsibility. Education is a government affair, perhaps the most important 
government affair at the state and local level, and the school teacher is the 
direct link between the government and the populace in this function. As the 
primary medium of the government message, the teacher certainly carries 
substantial responsibilities. Further, the private citizen decisions such as 
Lipscomb do not articulate the reasons why a teacher's control is "too remote or 
philosophical." 
• 
The policy argument says that there' would be a chilling effect on teacher 
effectiveness if they were subject to this defamation exception. However, the 
courts do not attempt to balance this evil against the countervailing harm of a 
chill on the media. The public official doctrine was developed originally as a 
shield for the media. When a court ignores this factor it loses sight of the 
original intent of the doctrine. 
BRENNAN'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL DOCTRINE 
Justice Brennan wrote a dissent from a certiorari denial on the public official 
question in Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich.60 Brennan, the author of the 
Rosenblatt decision, advocates a return to the standards set out in that case.61 
He gave a more expansive interpretation of the public official doctrine than the 
state courts and recognized that small newspapers would be singled out to bear 
the burden of a decision favoring teachers as private citizens.62 
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, said that a narrow reading of the doctrine 
would unnecessarily deprive publishers of the "breathing space"6S allowed for 
public expression and thus lead to a chilling effect on reports about borderline 
private individuals. The justices were most concerned about the effect on 
reporting by local papers, who rely heavily on coverage of these borderline 
58 Franklin v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Lodge 1108, 97 
Cal.App.3d at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 136. 
59 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 85. 
60 474 U.S. 953 (1985). 
61 See also Elder, Defamation, Public Officialdom and the Rosenblatt v. 
Baer Criteria -- A Proposal for Revivification: Two Decades after New York Times 
v. Sullivan. 33 Buffalo L. Rev. 579 (1984). 
62 [d. 
as [d. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963». 
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public officials. Small, non-daily newspapers have the fewest resources and are 
more easily influenced by threats of a lawsuit and potential libel damage 
awards.54 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the state court decisions reveals no clear trend in either 
direction on whether a public school teacher is a public official. The decision in 
New York Times v. Sullivan was announced a quarter century ago, yet courts 
continue to come up with contradictory results when assessing whether a teacher 
is a public official. 
One problem is that many courts confuse public official and public figure 
theories and interchange the definitions and criteria of the two concepts. There 
were several other issues in the Lipscomb case,65 the key issue being whether 
Cox acted negligently in gathering information for publication, and the public 
figure issue was given only threshold analysis. The court did little more 
than reiterate the minimal defamation protections under Gertz. 
Classifying a public school teacher as a private citizen causes much more of a 
chill on small newspapers than large ones. Small town newspapers devote much 
more coverage to schools and teachers than larger papers, and limitations in 
terms of capital, copy editing expertise and legal advice amount to a much greater 
chill on their ability to publish than on the ability of larger, daily newspapers. 
With little funding, it is easy for a small newspaper to be intimidated by the 
fear of a long, drawn-out lawsuit. Small newspapers traditionally employ persons 
with limited or no formal journalism training to write and edit articles. Cox, the 
author of the article in Lipscomb, received his college degree in economics, not 
journalism.66 Because of this lack of expertise in the editing process, the news 
editor of a small paper is going to be more reluctant to assign a story that has 
54 In Lipscomb the jury awarded the plaintiff $1,000,000 in compensatory 
damages and $45,000 in punitive damages. Supra n.5. 
65 In addition to the public official question, the court cited two main 
issues, and three collateral issues: 
(I) If Lipscomb was not a public official, was negligent publication by Cox 
and the newspaper subsumed in the jury's finding of a publication with reckless 
disregard for the truth; and, if so, was the evidence in this case sufficient to 
support a finding of negligent publication? 
(2) Was the evidence in this case sufficiently clear and convincing to support 
the jury's finding of publication by Cox with a reckless disregard for the truth, 
which Lipscomb must establish to recover punitive damages? 
Collateral issues were the admissibility of an expert's opinion on the 
standard of care, the obligation of a trial court to segregate potentially 
defamatory evidence from nondefamatory evidence in its instruction to the jury, 
and the size of the jury's verdict. 234 Va. at 281, 362 S.E.2d at 34. 
66. 234 Va. at 297 n.6, 362 S.E.2d at 43 n.6. 
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libel potential, and, when those stories are covered, the paper will err on the 
side of less coverage to avoid the risk of a defamation suit. 
The third effective chill on small papers deals with their comparative lack of 
legal assistance. While large papers can afford to have in-house counsel to 
prevent a libelous article from being published, or at least to mitigate the damage 
once a mistake has been made, small papers usually can only afford to retain an 
attorney to deal with problems after they have risen to the level of an impending 
lawsuit. In Lipscomb, the Virginia Supreme Court could have avoided this problem 
by exercising its power to give defamation defendants protection beyond the 
minimal federal requirements extended in Gertz.6T 
Coverage of borderline public officials, including schoolteachers, is the 
mllinstay of rural, non-daily publications which do not have the resources or 
economic incentive to cover national events' and figures. The market for coverage 
of larger events and people is adequately served by the metropolitan and national 
newspapers. People buy rural and non-daily newspapers to keep themselves 
informed on local matters such as religious organization activities, business and 
club functions, educational matters, and crime reports. The court does not fully 
realize the chill it has cast on small newspapers with the Lipscomb decision. 
Small papers do not have the resources to challenge this action. Any challenge 
in court must come from a larger metropolitan newspaper with the resources to 
take a court battle to Virginia's high court. Until then, local press in Virginia 
will be restrained from coverage of many of the events which make their 
publications viable. 
6T The Virginia Constitution contains an "abuse" clause where "any cItIzen 
may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of that right ... " Va. Const., Art. I, Sec. 12. While some 
state courts have relied on similar "abuse" provisions to follow the minimal 
protections of Gertz, see, e.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill.2d 184 (1975); McCall v. 
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 
U.S. 975 (1982). Other state courts have not felt themselves bound by similar 
clauses, see, Diversified Management v. Denver Post, Inc. 653 P.2d 1103. (Colo. 
1983); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 
Ind.App. 671 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). 
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VESTED RIGHTS IN LAND USE: MUNICIPALITIES V. DEVELOPERS 
INTRODUCTION 
Zoning is an area of the law which involves two opposing interests. Walter F. 
Witt, Jr., a partner in the law firm of Hunton & Williams, aptly summarized this 
opposition, saying, "The public interest in land use regulations, which is subject 
to frequent changes because of shifting demands, is set against the interest of 
landowners and developers which depends on determining with certainty 
permissible land uses."l Nowhere is this conflict more apparent than in the issue 
of whether rights can vest in uses given by municipal zoning ordinances. 
A vested right is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.) as: 
Rights which have so completely and definitely accrued to or settled 
in a person that they are not subject to be defeated or cancelled by 
the act of any other private person, and which it is right and. 
equitable that the government should recognize and protect, as being 
lawful in themselves, and settled according to the then current rules 
of law. . .. Such interests as cannot be interfered with by 
retrospective laws; interests which it is proper for the state to 
recognize and protect and of which the individual cannot be deprived 
arbitrarily without injustice. 
Vested rights, with respect to zoning, have evolved from the 14th Amendment's 
Due Process clause in the United States Constitution, which prohibits the illegal 
"taking" of an individual's property without just compensation.2 
Such rights are normally held protective of only the existing uses made by the 
landowner. There is no right, generally, to the continued existence of a zoning 
ordinance and to any prospective uses which are allowed thereunder. 
"[I]t is clear ... that an amendatory zoning regulation 
cannot be applied so as to require destruction, removal, 
or abatement of pre-existing structures or uses. It is 
equally clear, however, that a landowner who merely 
hopes or plans to develop his property in a certain way 
at some time in the future has no protection against 
zoning changes prohibiting such development."s 
The question is therefore where to draw the line between pre-existing uses and a 
"mere hope" of development. 
THE LAW IN GENERAL 
As mentioned above, there is no right to the continued existence of a given 
zoning ordinance. The rule in a majority of states allows for such ordinances to 
I "Vested Rights in Land Uses", Planning in Virginia, January, 1988. 
2 4 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, Sec.50-03(1). 
S 49 ALR3d 13 Sec. 2(a). 
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have retrospective effect on properties upon which there is no existing use.4 
Further, a landowner acquires no vested rights to continue or complete 
construction, or to initiate or continue a use, unless, prior to the effective date 
of the legislation, he has relied on a validly issued building permit, in good faith, 
by substantially changing expenditures or obligations. 
exceptions to this rule. 
There are two major 
According to the "Washington Rule," the right to develop the property vests at 
the time the permits are applied for in good faith. The ordinance in effect at 
that time is controlling, rather than any ordinance adopted subsequently.5 This is 
the most liberal rule, as it allows the point of vesting to be controlled totally by 
the developer, without regard to his loss if the subsequent ordinances were held 
applicable. 
The other exception, known as the "Illinois Rule," allows for vesting to occur 
at the time an application is made in good faith, as long as the landowner's 
position with regard to the land has· substantially changed, either through 
expenditure or obligation.6 This rule falls somewhere between the majority and 
Washington rules, in that it allows for vesting to occur at the earlier period in 
time (i.e., when the application is made), but requires the landowner to show the 
harmful affects from applying the subsequent ordinance. 
Many scholars and academics who have written on this subject have made a 
distinction between equitable estoppel and vested rights. Equitable estoppel 
focuses on the equities of the situation while upholding the municipality's right to 
rezone retrospectively. The vested rights issue focuses on the property interest 
of a landowner and the consequential lack of governmental police power to take 
such property away.7 Equitable estoppel is normally used in states which follow 
the majority rule, in order to give relief from the harshness of that rule, while 
vested rights analysis is used in the states that follow one of the exceptions. 
Whether in the form of equitable estoppel or one of the exceptions to the 
majority rule, the theoretical foundation is the same: fundamental fairness. The 
Supreme Court of Illinois recognized this and named the injustice resulting from 
upholding such a retrospectively-applied amended ordinance as their reasoning for 
the so-called "Illinois Rule." 
4 See 4 Rathkopf Sec. 50.03(3); 49 ALR3d 13 Sec. 2(a); 50 ALR3d 596 Sec. 
2(a); American Law of Zoning (3rd Ed.) Sec. 606. 
5 See 1988 Zoning and Planning Law Handbook, Clark Boardman Company, 
Ltd., New York, New York, 1988~ quoting Valley View v. Redmond, 107 Wash.2d 
621 (1986), and West Main Associates v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash.2d (1986). 
6 4 Rathkopf Sec. 50.03(2). 
7 See Witt, supra note I, at 15. 
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"Where an individual or corporation expends substantial sums 
relying on the then existing zoning and zoning ordinance and 
proceeds to seek a permit in compliance with them, it would be a 
grave injustice to allow municipal officials to hold up action on 
issuance of a building permit until an amendatory ordinance could 
be passed, changing the standards to be met so that a permit 
formerly lawful would now not be issued due to an abrupt change 
in the law."s 
Most courts, in analyzing this fairness, do so by looking at the "good faith" of 
the parties involved. In order to find good faith on the applicant's part, courts 
look to many of the following factors:9 
purchase of the property in question for the specific use indicated in the 
application for the building permit. 
relative usefulness of the subject property for other purposes. 
duration or stability of the zoning classification existing when the permit 
application was. filed. 
openness in dealings with municipal officialS, including inquiry into the 
current zoning status of the applicant's property and into the existence 
of any proposals to change the zoning, and free and full disclosure of the 
applicant's plans. 
receipt of assurances from municipal officials as to the legality of the 
proposed construction or as to the issuance of the requested permit. 
payment of filing fees or other costs in applying for a building permit. 
expenses and obligations incident to preparation for construction, such as 
payment of architectural or engineering fees, performance of preliminary 
site work not requiring a building permit, entering contracts for 
construction, supplies, and other building obligations, and similar matters. 
Similarly, in an effort to determine just resolutions, courts will aJso look at 
factors which relate to the municipality's good faith, such as: 10 
Inordinate or unexplained delay in processing the subject application, or 
its flat refusal to issue the requested permit at a time when Its issuance 
was lawful. 
Affirmative efforts to mislead the applicant or lull him into believing that 
his permit would be issued as a matter of course. 
The fact that the rezoning process was initiated solely because of the 
applicant's proposed construction, and was aimed at thwarting his plans. 
S Cos. Corp. v. City of Evanston, 27 Bl.2d 570 (1963). 
9 50 ALR3d 596 Sec. 2(b). 
10. [d. 
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Imposition of frivolous, technical, or previously unenforced requirements 
with respect to the permit application or the applicant's plans and 
specifica tions. 
In applying rules that also require the landowner to show a substantial change 
in position, there has been wide variance as to what constitutes fulfillment of 
that requirement. One theory requires the change in position to be measured in 
dollars and for that amount to be considered substantial when measured relative 
to the total development costs. This position has obtained momentum in many of 
the states applying the majority and Illinois niles.11 
THE LAW IN VIRGINIA 
Currently, the law in Virginia with respect to vested rights is unclear. 
Section 15.1-492 (Vested rights not impaired; nonconforming uses) of the Virginia 
Code provides relief to landowners who wish to continue an existing use allowed 
for under an old ordinance but prohibited under a subsequent one. Of course, 
this type of relief is in line with most' states and does not help in determining 
the issue at hand. The case law gives far more guidance but leaves undecided the 
specific issue of whether and when a prospective use, as allowed for under the 
existing ordinance, can become vested in a landowner, who has not yet actually 
begun using the property. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia has generally settled zoning issues with the 
underlying premise that a balance between the individual landowner and the 
society at large must be maintained so as to provide predictability in the law. 
The zoning statutes of Virginia, and those 
enacted by her political subdivisions, are designed to strike a 
delicate balance between private property rights and public 
interest. One who owns land always faces a possibility of its 
being rezoned. However, our policy, which holds that permissible 
land use should be reasonably predictable, assures a landowner that 
such use will not be changed suddenly, arbitrarily or capriciously, 
but only after a period of investigation and community planning, 
and only where circumstances substantially affecting the public 
interest have changed. As we said in Fair fax County v. Snell 
Corp., 214 Va. 655, 659 (1974): 'Such stability and predictability in 
the law serve the interest of both the landowner and the public.'12 
Given this general proposition, there are two cases, decided in 1972, which 
have universally been viewed as landmark cases in Virginia for this area of the 
law: Fairfax County v. Medical Structures 13 and Fairfax County v. Cities 
Service. 14 The cases are, for the most part, factually identical. They involve 
11 See Witt, supra note I, at 16. 
12 Cole v. City Council of Waynesboro, 218 Va. 827, 834 (1977). 
13 213 Va. 355 (1972). 
14 213 Va. 359 (1972). 
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property for which special use permits had been obtained prior. to the 
complainant's purchase of the property. The landowner then filed site plans with 
the appropriate Fairfax County authorities. Subsequent to the filing of these 
applications but prior to their approval, the County Board of Supervisors amended 
the pertinent zoning ordinances, so as to void the special use permits upon which 
the site plans were based. In Medical Structures, the court said: 
[T]hat where, as here, a special use permit has been granted under a 
zoning classification, a bona fide site plan has thereafter been filed 
and diligently pursued, and substantial expense has been incurred in 
good faith before a change in zoning, the permittee then has a 
vested right to the land use described in the use permit and he 
cannot be deprived of such use by· subsequent legislation. IS 
The Board of Supervisors in Medical Structures· relied heavily upon McClung v. 
County of Henrico. 16 McClung was issued a valid building permit based on a 
normal zoning classification and the zoning ordinance was subsequently amended 
so as to prevent the use allowed for in the permit, if construction was not begun 
in ninety days. The subsequent ordinance was allowed to control in that case 
even though McClung had cleared and graded the land, set up building stakes, 
hauled building stone to the site and contracted to have the foundation dug and 
poured. The court, after a detailed analysis of the definition of construction, 
denied that McClung's activity constituted a construction start. 
The court distinguished McClung in the latter two cases by saying that 
although the landowner had acquired a vested right in the use given by the 
permit, as was the case in Medical Structures, such rights expired when McClung 
failed to start construction within ninety days as was required by the zoning 
ordinance. Even though the court claimed there were factual differences and did 
not specifically overrule McCiung, McClung is clearly not in line with the court's 
reasoning in either Medical Structures or Cities Service. Practically speaking, it 
has lost any precedential power it might have had outside of its factual setting. 
In Cities Service, decided immediately after Medical Services, the Court quoted 
its decisions from Medical Services and found that the developer had acquired a 
vested right in the site plan application. based on the use allowed to him by the 
special use permi t. 17 
The line of reasoning used by the court in Medical Structures and Cities 
Service is generally thought to put Virginia among those states which follow the 
"Illinois Rule." Those in opposition to this reading of those cases, however, make 
the point that special use permits are far different from normal zoning 
IS Fairfax County v. Medical Structures, 213 Va. at 358. 
16 200 Va. 870 (1959). 
17 Fairfax County v. Cities Service, 213 Va. 359, 362 (1972). 
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classifications. Whereas special use permits offer the municipality an opportunity 
for site specific analysis and give the landowner an objective governmental act 
upon which to rely, normal zoning classifications give neither. That argument 
normally concludes by calling for building permit approval to be the <point in time 
at which vesting occurs with regard to such classifications. 
Even if this line of reasoning were followed, building permit approval would 
have to be replaced by site plan approval. If not fully accepting the Illinois rule, 
the court, in Medical Structures, cleady found, at least with regard to urban 
development, that the site plan had replaced the building permit as an appropriate 
point in time to mark both the landowner's and government's intent with respect 
to the property. "Under current planning practice in many urban localities, the 
site plap has virtually replaced the building permit as the most vital document in 
the development process."18 
In addition to Medical Structures and Cities Service, Planning Commission v. 
Berman19 has also been upheld as a key Virginia Supreme Court precedent in this 
area and furthers the premise that Virginia is following the Illinois Rule. In that 
case, the landowner applied for site plan approval for a restaurant in an area 
which was zoned to allow for such a use and which, in fact, had several free-
standing restaurants already. The landowner applied for site plan approval after 
having amended the preliminary plan, per the Planning Staff's recommendations. 
The site plan was denied by the Planning Commission, at which time the 
landowner filed for a writ of mandamus. Subsequent to all of these events, the 
City Council amended its zoning ordinance to prohibit the proposed use. 
The trial court awarded the writ, but on appeal to the state supreme court, 
the City claimed the amended ordinance should have been the law applied by the 
trial court. The Virginia Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the trial court's 
ruling, after finding that the ordinance was precipitated by the site plan 
application of the landowner. In doing so, the court said: 
The trial court has found on credible evidence 
that at the time their petition was filed, appellees had complied 
with all provisions of the ordinances of Falls Church and the 
usual procedures and requirements, or were ready, willing and able 
to comply. Under such circumstances, approval of the site plan 
and the issuance of a permit were no longer discretionary but 
ministerial and mandatory.20 
This case seems to indicate that the site specific analysis associated with 
special use permits and site plan approval is not a factor which should be 
18 Fairfax County v. Medical Structures, 213 Va. 355, 357 (1972). 
19 211 Va. 774 (1971). 
20 [d. at 776-7. 
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considered by the courts of Virginia in their analysis of this issue. It is also an 
indication that normal zoning classifications are a sufficient governmental act 
upon which landowners should be able to rely in making their development plans. 
The specific issues of whether a landowner has a vested, right in a by-right 
use21 allowed for under the zoning classification of his land and 'outlined in his 
site plan application and, at what point in time such a right vests, have not been 
decided by the Court. Two recent cases in Alexandria involve exactly these 
issues. The facts of each case are virtually identical. 
The first case (F ADCO) was decided against the landowner and remains on 
appeal before the Virginia Supreme Court.22 In this case, the developer filed a 
site plan for construction of a 150-foot office building, which height was allowed 
under the existing ordinance. Subsequent to the application, the ordinance was 
amended so as to prohibit heights over 50 feet, with heights of 77 feet allowed 
for by special use permit; The amended ordinance gave its restrictions 
retroactive effect to all site plan 'applications not yet approved. The Planning 
Commission denied F ADCO's 'application based on the amended ordinance and the 
City Council affirmed their decision. FADCO sought a declaratory judgment and 
the city filed a motion for summary judgment. In awarding summary judgment, 
the circuit court said that, absent a special use permit or another form of 
govern men tal approval specific to the applicant's property, the applicant had no 
vested interest in the site plan application for a proposed use. 
The second case was in federal district court but was settled before the court 
made its decision.23 In Potomac Greens, the developer filed a site plan for a use 
allowed under the existing ordinance. At the public hearing before the, Planning 
Commission, it was determined that the height of the building applied for 
exceeded the heights permitted by the existing ordinance and,' by agreement, 
consideration of the site plan was deferred. A revised site plan, with a lower 
height, was then submitted for the Commission's next public hearing. Prior to 
the developer's first application, the City Council had initiated the process of 
amending its ordinance, to prevent the use applied for by the developer without a 
special use permit. The ordinance became effective between the time the revised 
site plan was filed and heard by the Planning Commission at its next hearing. 
21 Under a given zoning ordinance, a landowner is allowed some uses 
automatically or "by right", and some uses under a special use permit, if such a 
permit is approved by the municipality. 
22 First Ameriland Development and Construction Company (FADCO) v. 
City of Alexandria, At Law No. 1132d (1987). 
23 
1987). 
Potomac Greens v. City of Alexandria, Civil Action 831A (E.D. Alex. 
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The case was never decided. The memoranda for both sides, however, typify 
the pro and con arguments of this issue. The developer argued that laws are 
generally not applied retroactively and that that rule applies in Virginia to 
"substantive" as well as "vested" rights. As precedent, he cited Shiflet v. Eller24 
and Potomac Hospital Corp. v. Dillon.26 Further, he claimed that the decisions in 
Medical Structures and Cities Service were distinguished as involving special use 
permits. Additionally,. citing Sullivan v. Town of Salem26 and Bain v. Boykin,27 
he made the argument that a case should be determined by the law as it exists at 
the time of decision by the court. He also argued that laws are routinely given 
retroactive effect where the legislative branch enacting such a statute has 
indicated that such was their intent. 
In fur~hering this reasoning, the city makes its most compelling argument by 
citing Chesterfield Civic Association v. Board of Zoning Appeals,28 a case decided 
by 0W-_ S.llpreme Court of Virginia two years after the court's landmark decisions 
in lv!edical -Structures and· Cities Service. In Chester field, the developer applied 
to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) for a special use permit, which the BZA 
was allowed to ·grant under the existing ordinance. Subsequent to the landowner's 
applications but prior to the BZA's decision, the County Board of Supervisors 
amended the ordinance withdrawing the power of the BZA to grant special use 
permits, reserving it to themselves. The amended ordinance was silent as to the 
retroactivity of the law. The BZA awarded the special use permit and the 
complainant civic association then filed a writ of certiorari to have the decision 
overturned. The court overruled the BZA's grant of the special use permit by 
upholding the retroactive effect of the amended ordinance. The city used this 
case to press the point that local governments have the unquestioned authority to 
amend their own zoning ordinances and to apply such an amended ordinance to 
any pending applications. 
While this is admirable advocacy, it is probably not a fair reading of that case. 
The court, in Chester field, primarily based its decision on the fact that the 
authority to grant special use permits ultimately resides in the Board of 
Supervisors or a like governing body. Further, the court said that that body is 
able to. delegate that authority and, as in Chesterfield, to withdraw any such 
authority so delegated. Since the authority was withdrawn from the BZA before 
24 228 Va. 115 (1984). 
26 229 Va. 355, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985). 
26 805 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1986). 
27 180 Va. 259 (I 942). 
28 215 Va. 399 (1974). 
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they acted upon the application, the application approved subsequently was held to 
have been invalidly approved and as such, was void. ; 
In a more recent case in Alexandria, this line of reasoning was used by the 
city to defend itself against another claim involving a retroactive zoning 
ordinance. Dominions Lands v. The City of Alexandria.29 In that case, the 
developer submitted a site plan for a development 'which met the existing height 
limitations of 50 feet. The planning staff recommended approval.' The site plan 
was scheduled for review by the PlanriingComniission' on September I, 1987, arid 
the developer claimed it was in conformance with the existing ordinance and that 
they were "ready, willing and able to comply" with the planning staff's 
recommendations. The Planning Commission deferred the review ,until October 6, 
1987 and then recommended an amendment to the city ordinance which would 
have limited the height of development in the area to 30 feet, with 50 feet 
allowed for by special use permit. 
The city council then failed to approve the ordinance before the October 6th 
review and the Planning Commission was thus forced' to recommend approval. 
These actions may have been prompted by an action in mandamus which was filed 
by the developer when it heard of the proposed ordinance. The city council 
subsequently approved the amended ordinance on October 13, 1987. The adjacent 
property owners appealed the approval of the site plan by the Planning 
Commission, additionally claiming that the amended ordinance should be applied to 
the case on appeal. The developer filed for a declaratory judgment and when the 
matter came before the council, they deferred it until the issue could be settled 
in Court. 
Primarily relying on Planning Commission v. Berman30 and'Shiflet v.' Eller,31 
the developer maintained that site plan approval was a ministerial function, that 
they were "ready, willing: and able" to proceed with construction under the 
existing zoning and that statutes are presumably prospective and should not be 
given retroactive effect. 
The City argued two points. First, it argued that the case was not ripe, 
because the use required by Dominion Lands could still be applied for and that it 
had not been to date. Secondly, citing' Chester field Civic Association v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals,32 the city argued that final authority for approval of site plans 
rested with the city council and so many preliminary administrative approvals 
29 At Chancery No. 18106 (1987). 
30 211 Va. 774 (1971). 
31 22,8 Va. liS (1984). 
32 215 Va. 399 (1974). 
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could not be relied ,on by the developer. Therefore, the city council should be 
able to apply the law as it exists when' they make their final review of a site 
plan. 
The circuit court, however, found in favor of the developer. First, it held 
that having a by-right use changed to a use available only by permit was injury 
enough to warrant adjudication.· Secondly, the court, citing Medical Structures, 
said that the preliminary. site plan had virtually replaced the building permit and 
that once its approval was given, the building permit was normally given as a 
matter of course. Therefore, the ordinance passed subsequent to Planning 
Commission approval of such a site plan should not be given retroactive effect, 
especially because there was no indication by the council, in approving the 
or.ciinance, that they intended to give it such an effect. 
CONCLUSION 
The case note briefs of the lower court opinions above signify both the 
complexity of this issue and' its unsettled state in the Commonwealth. The, issue 
will hopefully be decided by the holding of the Virginia Supreme Court in the 
F ADCO litigation. The following is an attempt to prognosticate the outcome of 
that case and thus, give a fair reading of the court's precedent in this area. 
The two most important cases remain Medical Structures and Cities Service. 
These are the only cases in which the court specifically recognizes the "vested 
rights" of a property owner to a use of his prope:ty allowed for by local 
ordinance, while. deciding a zoning issue. Although both cases in vol ve uses 
allowed the landowner by previously awarded special use permits, the opinions of 
the cases focus on the substantial change in position of the landowner in reliance 
upon a use so given and not upon the legislative act conferring those rights 
originally. 
First, the CO,urt included the argument of Medical Structures in its opinion, 
that "once a diligently pursued site plan is filed in reliance upon existing zoning 
or the issuance of a special use permit, fairness dictates that a vested right is 
acquired in the land use.,,33 The court then followed this statement of the 
respondent with its finding that the site plan has replaced the building permit as 
the most important, document for development, saying, "The filing of such a plan 
creates a monument to the developer's intention, and when the plan is approved, 
the building permit, except in rare situations, will be issued."34 
Immediately following that case, the Court decided Cities Service, which they 
found "factually similar," and said, "[a]ccordingly, we hold that Cities Service's 
38 Fairfax County v. Medical Structures, 213 Va. 355, 357 (1972). 
84 [d. at 358. 
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right to the land use described in the use permit vested upon the filing of the 
site plan .... "36 
Attempts are often made to distinguish these cases as involving special use 
permits, as stated above. Normally, this is done by quoting the respondent's 
argument as outlining the issue to be reliance on the existing zoning and/or the 
special use permit, and then stating how the court specifically refused to decide 
the broader issue and only decided as to the use given by a special use permit. 
This is then interpreted as an affirmative act by the court to hold that site plans 
based on normal zoning classifications do not carry the same vested rights as do 
plans based on special use permits. 
A fairer interpretation, given the dicta in both cases concerning the 
substantial expense which both developers had incurred in preparation of their 
site plans, would be that the court simply chose not to settle issues not directly 
before it. Continuing the reasoning of the court in these cases to its logical 
conclusion concerning the issue of this memorandum, it would simply not make 
sense to protect the substantial expense incurred by the landowner prior to a site 
plan's submission with regard to use given by a special use permit and not grant 
the same protection to a developer whose plan is predicated upon a by-right use 
given by a normal zoning classification. Both are legislative acts of the 
governing body regulating a landowner's property which are subject to change, 
and, barring such a change, should be grounds upon which a landowner can rely 
in making plans for the use of his property. 
In addition to these case precedents, the court's holding in Berman also 
bolsters the argument that rights should vest at the time a site plan is filed, even 
when it is based upon normal zoning classifications. In that case, the court's 
decision found site plan approval by the governing body of a municipality to be 
"ministerial' and mandatory" rather than "discretionary" where the landowner was 
"ready, willing, and able to comply" with the applicable ordinances or usual 
procedures and requirements of that locality.36 Further, the most recent 
case involving land use issues, Cole v. City Council of Waynesboro,37 upheld land 
use predictability as being of paramount importance. The court said that land use 
designations should not be suddenly changed but altered only after careful 
consideration "and only where circumstances substantially affecting the public 
interest have changed.,,38 
36. Fairfax County v. Cities Service, 213 Va. 359, 362 (1972). 
36 211 Va. 774, 776-7 (1971). 
37 218 Va. 827 (1977). 
38 [d. at 834. 
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Clearly, these cases taken in concert place Virginia more in line with the 
Illinois rule than with either the majority or Washington Rules, as quoted earlier. 
The rule in Virginia, therefore, would seem to be, that a landowner acquires a 
vested right in the use applied for in a site plan, at the time in which such a 
plan is filed in good faith, if such a use is a designated by-right use under the 
existing zoning classification of the land for which the site plan is filed, or the 
use is founded upon a previously-issued special use permit. 
The only case which may fall outside of this analysis of the Virginia Supreme 
Court precedent in this area is Chester field Civic Association v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals.39 In that case, the court held that the ultimate police power to make 
zoning decisions lies with the legislative body of a municipality, as granted by the 
Gel}eral Assembly, and that, therefore, such power may be reserved to that body 
so as to void any applications before lower administrative agencies, or decisions 
subsequent to such a reservation. The argument could be made for extending this 
holding to include the further premise that any site plan application before the 
Planning Commission can be held invalid at the governing body's pleasure, as the 
Commission's power of approval is delegated to it by the local governing body, 
and therefore, it cannot be relied on by the developer in making his plans. 
This argument was attempted by the city in the Dominion Lands case but was 
rejected by the circuit court of Alexandria. That reading of Chester field would 
be in direct conflict with the decisions in Medical Structures. Cities Service and 
Berman. There is no precedent for the notion that only the governing body's 
approval is enough of a governmental act upon which the landowner can state 
reliance, because only that body has constitutionally delegated police power. Even 
conceding this case as precedent, a municipality would presumably have to 
completely withdraw a Planning Commission's power to itself before any pending 
applications would lose their associated vested rights, as was the case in 
Chester field. Local city councils and/or Boards of Supervisors are unlikely to 
take this drastic step in order to thwart one developer's plans. Further, any 
repeated use of this mechanism would surely be held as an "arbitrary and 
capricious" act and therefore illegal as against the "Due Process" clause of the 
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
ST A TUTOR Y RELIEF 
Even if the above rule is an effective reading of the existing Virginia Common 
Law in this area, problems remain. The two most obvious are those of (I) what 
constitutes a "filing" and (2), at what time an ordinance becomes "existing"; or, 
phrased differently, when is an application made in good faith. 
39 215 Va. 399 (1974). 
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Although, the prospective supreme court holding in the FADeO litigation could 
conceivably settle these disputes, it is unlikely, given that court's propensity for 
failing to settle issues not strictly within the facts of the case before it. A more 
appropriate remedy for this issue, in any event, is legislation by the General 
Assembly of Virginia. 
Walter F. Witt, Jr., in his article "Vested Rights in Land Uses,"40 gives a solid 
proposal for such legislation which adequately balances the individual landowner's 
rights and the interests of the public at large, as well as complying with the 
pertinent precedents of the Virginia Supreme Court. He proposes three 
legislati ve steps. 
(I) Legislation which provides for rights in land uses which have become 
vested by way of existing zoning ordinances and a landowner's reliance 
upon them. 
(2) Legislation which prescribes points in time at which such rights become 
vested. He maintains that three such points exist: 
When an application is made for subdivision of a residential 
property. 
When an application for site plan approval is made with relation to 
a multi-family, commercial, or an industrial project. 
When an application for a building permit. is made. He maintains 
that such legislation should, likewise, require accompanying land use 
or building plans so as to satisfy the substantial expenditure 
requirement as a matter of course. 
(3) Legislation which defines time limits for such vested rights, so as to 
invalidate such a right, as acquired above, if the project is not begun 
within a designated time period. 
While, as a whole, these proposals are a good foundation upon which 
legislation could be based, there are some factors which are not considered and 
should be. 
With respect to the second step, a specific body should be designated as the 
agency to whom an application must be made for rights to vested. The most 
appropriate and equitable body would probably change according to the type of 
application, but should be spelled out nonetheless. Likewise, the type of 
application to be made should be specifically outlined for each situation (i.e., 
preliminary versus final site plan). 
Additionally, a caveat should be included which defines existing law as a law 
which has actually been passed by the local governing body, thereby relieving the 
developer from considering any proposed legislation. Actual adoption by the 
40 Witt, supra note 1. 
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governing body is not only a clear point in time upon which to base the 
legislation, but also prevents proposed statutes from obtaining prospective effect 
and thus delaying a developer's plans based on laws which may never be passed. 
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VIRGINIA'S FELONY - MURDER DOCTRINE: 
FROM HASKELL TO KING AND THE PROBLEMS IN-BETWEEN 
INTRODUCTION 
English common law extended the punishment for murder to cases where a 
murder occurs during the commission of a felony. The common law classified this 
as secondary to the murder, but today it has been codified into what is known as 
the felony-murder doctrine.1 The doctrine allows an accomplice to a felony to be 
convicted of murder if one of the principals of the felony kills someone while 
perpetrating the felony. What follows is an analysis of the elements of the 
felony-murder doctrine, and of some of the problems that the Virginia court 
system has faced in defining these elements. 
DISCUSSION 
Elements of the Underlying Felony (Felony Requirements) 
In order to apply the doctrine, the principals in the first and second degree 
must be in the process of committing a felony, one element of which is an actus 
reus (voluntary act) by each party. The key act by the accomplice is a voluntary 
action of aiding and abetting, keeping watch or lookout, encouraging, or inciting 
the "principal in the first degree" while the felony is either being planned2 or is 
in progress.3 
1 People v. Goldvarg, 346 Ill. 398, 178 N.E. 892 (1931). See also Wooden v. 
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981). 
Brief History of Felony-Murder 
The felony-murder rule developed as a natural part of common law murder. 
Its consequences were of no real concern when the rule was originally applied 
because the punishment for all felonies was death. The underlying felony had the 
same punishment as the killing that took place as a corollary to the felony. It is 
only in modern times when the punishment for felonies changed to include 
penalties other than death that the felony-murder rule came under attack for its 
harshness. 
The contention by many jurists, who oppose the doctrine, is either that 
felony-murder is unnecessary because it is subsumed under statutory murder or 
that felony-murder is unfair because it punishes without proving culpability. For 
these reasons, many states have either abolished felony-murder (Kentucky, Hawaii 
and Michigan) or have restrained its use (Arkansas, Delaware and New 
Hampshire). People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980). 
However, the state of Virginia has codified felony-murder in two statutes 
that give it wide applicability to criminal proceedings in the state. Va. Code 
Ann. Sees. 18.32-33 (1988). 
2 Horton v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 848, 38 S.E. 184 (1901). 
3 Moerhing v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 290 S.E.2d 891 (1982). See also 
Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 265, 343 S.E.2d 465 (1986); Brown v. 
Commonwealth, 180 Va. 733, 107 S.E. 809 (1921); Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 
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The second element of a felony is mens rea (intent to commit a felony).· 
The accomplice must act with purpose, and must consciously engage in felonious 
conduct. Shared criminal intent with "principal in the first degree".6 This 
element can be fulfilled by inference if actus reus is met. However, if this type 
of purposeful conduct is lacking, one may use the "willful blindness" rule set 
forth in United States v. Jewell.6 
In that case, the defendant was paid one hundred dollars to drive a car across 
the United States/Mexican border. The defendant did not know that one 
hundred and ten pounds of marijuana was in the trunk of the car. The defendant 
contended that he was not an accomplice because he lacked the criminal intent 
necessary for the illegal transportation of the drugs. The court held that he 
should' have inquired further from the "principal in the first degree" as to why he 
was being paid to drive across the border. The court termed the defendant's 
conduct "willful blindness" and ruled that intent may be proven by a showing that 
the accomplice should have been aware that the conduct he was participating in 
was probably felonious. 1 A reasonable man standard, similar to that used to 
demonstrate negligence, should be used to prove "willful blindness".8 
370, 157 S.E.2d 907 (1967); and Va. Code Sec. 18.2-18 (1982 and Supp.1986, 
1987). 
The full text of the Virginia statute Sec. 18.2-18 reads: 
How principals in second degree and accessories before the fact punished.--
In the case of every felony, every principal in the second degree and every 
accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all 
respects as if a principal in the first degree; provided, however, that except in 
the case of a killing for hire under the provisions of Section 18.2-31 (b) an 
accessory before the fact or principal in the second degree to a capital murder 
shall be indicted, tried, convicted and punished as though the offense were 
murder in the first degree. 
4 Horton v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 848, 38 S.E. 184 (1901). 
6 Hall v. Commonwealth, 225 Va 533, 303 S.E.2d 903 (1983). See also 
Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 306 S.E.2d 886 (1983). 
6 United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976). 
1 [d. 
8 [d. The language used by the court in Jewell is consistent with a 
negligence standard of reasonable care. 
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Actus Reus (First Element of Felony-Murder) 
Aside from the felonious act, felony-murder requires a necessary sequence of 
events leading up to the murder.9 The intent to commit the felony must precede 
the intent to kill. If not, the murder is independent of the felony and the 
accomplice is not liable under a felony-murder theory.10 Thus, a felon (principal 
in the first degree) cannot kill his victim and then decide to rob him. 
The murder must occur during the felony as defined by the actus reus. Generally, 
this question, is answered in part by the satisfaction of the proximate cause 
requirement. The determination of the length of time encompassed by the felony 
is critical to the application of the doctrine.ll In Haskell, the defendant helped 
to rob a sailor in the city of Norfolk by offering the sailor a ride and then 
stopping at a predetermined location for his counterparts to rob him. After the 
robbery had ended, the sailor would not allow the felons to escape. Finally, one 
co-felon shot the sailor in the chest to ensure their escape. 
The court in Haskell overruled Mason v. Commonwealth, where felony-murder 
was not applied to an escaping felon.12 The court in Haskell ruled that "the 
felony-murder doctrine applies where the initial felony and homicide were parts of 
one continuous transaction and' were closely related in point of time, place, and 
causal connection, as where the killing was done in flight from the scene of the 
crime to prevent detection or promote escape."13 The court in Haskell, citing 
People v. Salas, stated " ... robbery is not terminated until the robber has won his 
way to a place of temporary safety".14 
The classic fact scenario is People v. Gladman. The felons were termed to 
still be in the process of committing the felony even though they were in a 
parking lot a half mile from the murder-robbery site. The court held that the 
felons, who were fleeing a delicatessen, were in the process of robbing the store 
9 This section refers not to the existence of the underlying felony, but to 
additional elements that must co-exist with the underlying felony to establish 
felony-murder actus reus. 
10 LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, 637 (2d ed. 1986). 
11 Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033,243 S.E.2d 477 (1978). 
12 Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 105 S.E.2d 149 (1958). 
13 Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. at 1041, 243 S.E.2d at 482. 
14 [d., citing People v. Salas, 7 Ca1.3d 812, 500 P.2d 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 431, 
58 A.L.R.3d 832 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 939 (1973). 
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until they had traveled to a safe and secure place, and until their "booty", if 
there was any, was safe.16 
Stipulated Felonies (Part of the Felony-Murder Actus Reus) 
There;'are two classes of felonies to which the felony-murder doctrine applies, 
and varying punishments that accompany these two classes. The first class is 
statutory and is listed in the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32.16 This class includes 
arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate object sexual penetration, robbery, 
burglary, and abduction. The accomplice to any of these felonies is charged with 
first degree murder if a killing occurs. The punishment is that for a Class 2 
felony.17 The second class of felony is stipulated in the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 
18.2-33.18 If an accidental murder occurs as a result of any other felony not 
listed in Sec. 18.2-32, the felony-murder doctrine can apply.19 However, the 
.15 People v. Gladman, 41 N.Y.2d 123, 359 N.E.2d 420 (1976). 
16. Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 (1982 and Supp. 1986, 1987). 
The full text of the statute reads: 
First and second degree murder defined; punishment.--
Murder, other than capital murder, by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, 
starving, or by any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or in the 
commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate 
object sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction, except as provided in 
Section 18.2-31, is murder of the first degree, punishable as a Class 2 felony. 
All murder other than capital murder and murder in the first degree is 
murder of the second degree and is punishable' as a Class 3 felony. 
17 See Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981). 
18. Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-33 (1982 and Supp. 1986,87). 
The full text of the statute reads: 
Felony homicide defined; punishment.--
The killing of one accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties, 
while in the prosecution of some felonious act other than those specified in 
Sections 18.2-31 and 18.2-32, is murder of the second degree and is punishable as 
a Class 3 felony. 
19 In Aaron, the Michigan Supreme Court contended that the inherent 
unfairness in the felony-murder doctrine stems from holding felons guilty of 
accidental deaths that should be categorized as manslaughter, not murder, because 
there is no malice. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980). 
However, in the actual usage of the doctrine this flaw is corrected through 
the use of proximate cause "foreseeability· and "furtherance of the felony· rules. 
If a death is foreseeable then there is an inherent danger in the underlying 
felony. This danger connotes reckless behavior and malice by a felon who 
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accomplice can only be convicted of second degree murder and is punished for a 
Class 3 felony.2o 
In addition to these two accepted classes, a new class is developing beyond the 
felonies in the statutory listing of the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32. Under 
Heacock v. Commonwealth any "inherently dangerous" felony that can cause death 
or serious injury regardless of whether the death is accidental can be used to 
apply the doctrine.21 In that case, a drug dealer distributed cocaine to some 
friends at a party. One friend went into convulsions and died after ingesting the 
coke. The court in Heacock deemed the killing nonaccidental, but applied the 
felony-murder doctrine, although drug possession is not one of the felonies listed 
under the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32. 
The court held that the felony was in the possession and ingestion of the coke 
and that the defendant aided and abetted the perpetrator by distributing the 
cocaine to him in the first place. The court further stated that cocaine is 
"inherently dangerous" to human life and its ingestion is not accidental. Thus the 
court concluded that "inherently dangerous felonies" are a new category of 
felony-murder punishable as a second degree murder offense. The defendant 
contended that felony-murder could not apply because the victim was a co-felon. 
However, the court ruled that a co-felon can be a victim for purposes of felony-
murder. 22 
Although the court applied Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-33 as to the punishment of 
the offense (second degree murder), the court, like other courts, seemed to be 
hinting that an "inherently dangerous felony" could constitute first degree 
murder.23 The judicial trend in the future of Virginia seems to be toward 
proceeds without regard to the danger. Additionally, the "furtherance of the 
felony" rule shows that the killing was not accidental, but contributed to the 
success of the underlying felony. The unfairness must not be in the killing and 
the nonuse of manslaughter, but in holding the accomplice liable for the murder 
when he had no intent to commit it. For a discussion of transferred malice see 
footnotes 41 and 50. 
20 See Whiteford v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. 721 (1828). 
21 Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984). 
22 [d. 
23 The Virginia Supreme Court used language more consistent with Va. 
Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 than with Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-33. However, it found 
the murder to be second, not first, degree as Va.· Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 
specifies. [d. 
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expanding Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 to include "inherently dangerous felonies·, 
but with the advent of a more restrictive Virginia Court of Appeals which now 
hears all criminal appeals, this expansion seems unlikely. Thus, four years after 
the supreme court's opinion in Heacock there are still no Virginia cases that 
expressly hold that Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 should be expanded.24 
Virginia's Accomplice Doctrine (Validating Felony-Murder) 
According to Briley v. Commonwealth, a "principal in the second degree" is as 
culpable as the "principal in the first degree" if the accomplice has met the actus 
reus and the mens rea requirements of the felony. Hence, the felony-murder 
24. Felony-Murder and the Death Penalty 
Although an accomplice cannot usually be convicted even under Va. Code 
Ann. Sec. 18.32 of capital murder, the United States Supreme Court made an 
exception in its recent decision in Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.Ct. 1676 (1987), reh'n 
denied, 107 S.Ct. 3201 (1987). In that case two brothers broke their father out of 
prison. While escaping, their car broke down in the desert. To obtain another 
vehicle, the father stopped a car on the highway and killed the family in the car. 
The brothers did not participate in the killing, but sat idly by while their father 
brutally killed the family. The Supreme Court held that the initial felony was the 
escape ant that the killing occurred while the escape was still in progress. The 
felony-murder rule was therefore applicable to the killing. Although this would 
normally result in the brothers' conviction for first degree murder, the fact that 
the brothers showed reckless indifference to human life by watching their father 
kill the family without attempting to stop him warranted the death penalty for 
both brothers. Thus the death penalty can apply to special cases of felony-
murder. 
Does this explanation of felony-murder and the death penalty demonstrate 
the continued reasoning as set out by the common law in regard to felony-murder 
and deterrence? Francis B. Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law, 527-531 (1930), quoting 
Regina v; Seme and another, 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887) and People v. Washington, 62 
Cal.2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965). The answer to this is 
embodied in the difference in the degree of culpability between an accomplice 
who has no knowledge of the approaching murder until after the fact and an 
accomplice who is a witness to the entire incident and has the opportunity to 
stop the murder. The difficulty is in how foreseeable the murder must be to the 
accomplice at the scene of the crime. Surely if the principal pulls out a gun and 
shoots the storekeeper spontaneously, the accomplice has no time to stop the 
murder. The court determines the reasonableness of the opportunity. As to the 
degree of culpability and its application to the common law policy behind felony-
murder, it seems that as the culpable conduct of the accomplice rises, so does the 
ability that the accomplice possesses to deter the murder. Under the robbery 
scenario, the ability to deter the principal is less than in Tison where the two 
brothers just stood by and watched. Since the common law policy of deterrence 
is at the heart of the doctrine, it is only logical that the punishment should 
increase with the need to deter". Seen in this light, one may better understand 
how the United States Supreme Court in the majority opinion written by Sandra 
Day O'Connor reached its conclusion in Tison. 
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doctrine holds the accomplice liable for the murder committed by the "principal 
in the first degree."25 
Corpus Delicti (Second Element of Felony-Murder) 
The second general requirement that must be satisfied is that someone must be 
killed.26 However, death does not need to occur during the actual felony, but 
must be a proximate result of injuries received during the commission of the 
felony.27 If a body is not found, this requirement may still be satisfied by 
showing circumstantial evidence of the death.28 
Proximate Cause (Third Element of Felony-Murder) 
The third requirement is that the felony must be the proximate cause of the 
murder.29 This requirement is composed of a two-pronged test. First, the 
murder must satisfy the traditional "but for" prong. "But for" the commission of 
this particular felony by the principals in the first and second degree, the murder 
would not have taken place.so Generally, if one proves the felony and the corpus 
delicti, one also passes the "but for" prong.S1 
25 Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563,273 S.E.2d 57 (1980). 
26 
18.2-32. 
Smith v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 809 (1871). See also Va. Code Ann. Sec. 
27 State v. Shortridge, 54 N.D. 779, 211 N.W. 336 (1926). 
28 Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 294 S.E.2d 882 (1982). 
29 Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d. 811 (1981). See also 
Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32. 
so See Doane v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 500, 237 S.E.2d 797 (1977). 
SI. The "Year and a Day" Rule Re-Explored 
The "but for" analysis includes the traditional "year and a day" rule. 
Although the rule is still used in murder cases today, the rule is treated as a 
rebuttable presumption, not as a concrete stipulation. The rule evolved due to 
the absence of medical practices that could adequately determine the causes of 
death. Thus, the rule supplied the State with a means of ascertaining proximate 
cause. If the defendant's act was over a year from the victim's death, than 
proximate cause could not be established and the defendant would be set free. In 
today's world of high tech medicine, the determination of cause is much easier 
than when the traditional rule was established. For example, in a case of 
poisoning, where the traditional rule would fail to establish proximate cause if the 
57 
The second prong of the test is much more stringent than the initial "but for" 
prong. Because the murder is classified under the "but for" prong as dependent 
on the felony, the second prong narrows this link by adding the requirement of 
foreseeability to the picture. The murder must not only be· dependent, but it 
must also be foreseeable.32 In Haskell, the foreseeability issue is satisfied by Va. 
Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32, as a murder in connection with any of the listed felonies 
is foreseeable perse.33 
According to People v. Kessler. this second prong is deemed the "accomplice 
theory".M In Commonwealth v. Redline this "Accomplice Theory" was refined 
from mere nexus or foreseeability to furtherance of the felony.35 A co-felon or 
accomplice is only liable for the actions of the "principal in the first degree" if 
the murder was in the furtherance of the felony; that is, the murder must be the 
nattIral and probable consequence of the felony.36 Haskell reemphasizes this 
prong by defining "furtherance" in the Virginia court system as "closely related in 
point of time, place, and causal connection".37 
Thus in a case where felons are robbing a store and the store manager fights 
back, the use by one felon of deadly force to kill the manager is foreseeable.38 
Additionally, the felon furthered the success of the robbery by killing one who 
poison had been administered over a long period of time, medical science today 
can trace the cause of death directly to the poison and establish proximate cause. 
As a result, medical science has availed the State a method in which the 
traditional rule can be rebutted. 
See generally, Rollin M Perkins, Perkins on Criminal Law, 690-96 (2d ed. 1969). 
32 [d. 
33 Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033,243 S.E.2d 477 (1978). 
34 People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29 (Ill. 1974). 
36 Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958). See also 
Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981). 
36 [d. 
37 Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. at 1041, 243 S.E.2d at 483. 
38 It is within contemplation that people may be hurt in a robbery, as 
stipulated in Va. Code Ann.18.2-32. The legislative intent was to deem certain 
crimes dangerous by their very nature and thus limit judicial mercy by stipulating 
the punishment as a class 2 felony (first degree murder). Va. Code Ann. 18.2-32 
(1982 and Supp. 1986, 1987). 
58 
had the potential to apprehend him. In this situation the second prong would be 
satisfied because a tighter link between the robbery and the murder would be 
established. 
The harder case is an accidental murder. For example, suppose an embezzler 
steals from his employer. While escaping from the premises with the money, he 
inadvertently pushes an innocent bystander into the street where the bystander is 
killed by an oncoming car, or kills someone while operating the getaway car. Is 
the death of the bystander a foreseeable consequence of his felony? Perhaps the 
better question is whether this killing furthers the felonies just committed so as 
to be causally connected to them. Ultimately, the satisfaction of the second 
prong is not as automatic as it may see,m.39 
39 See King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351 (1988), as an example of 
the difficulty in determining "furtherance" and proximate cause. 
Note: Confusion over Proximate Cause (The Evolution of Proximate Cause in the 
Virginia Court System) 
There is confusion among Doane. Haskell. Heacock. King (an Appeals Court 
case), Wooden, which cites Redline, as to how they fit into the overall picture of 
proximate cause. "In Doane v. Commonwealth we reserved the question whether 
the application of the rule requires a showing of causal relationship or whether a 
showing of mere nexus will suffice. We do not decide that question here because 
it is foreclosed by the evide'nce which we consider conclusive." Heacock v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 404, 323 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1984) (citing Doane v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 500, 237 S.E.2d 797 (1977». The Virginia Appeals Court 
used this quote in Heacock to decide for itself that proximate cause was not mere 
nexus, but causal connection. King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351 (1988). 
Thus, in the court's opinion it decided an issue that the Virginia Supreme Court 
would not. However, the Virginia Supreme Court in Heacock (1984) overlooked its 
decision in Haskell (1978), which occurred a year after Doane (1977). Heacock v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 397, 323 S.E.2d at 90. 
In Haskell the court defined its position on proximate cause not as "mere 
nexus", but as causal connection. The "felony-murder statute applies where the 
killing is so closely related to the felony in time, place and causal connection as 
to make it a -part of the same criminal enterprise." Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 
Va. at 1044, 243 S.E.2d at 483. The Wooden case in 1981 adds to the confusion by 
citing proximate cause through the Redline definition, but ,made no attempt to 
define what "furtherance of the felony" as stipulated in Redline meant as applied 
to Virginia law. Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981). 
Thus, in order to clear the confusion, one must continue to rely upon Haskell in 
truly understanding what "furtherance" or proximate cause in regards to felony-
murder connotes in Virginia. Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. at 1944, 243 
S.E.2d at 483. The key is in the causal relationship between the felony and the 
murder. Therefore, the grand conclusion of the Virginia Court of Appeals in King 
had already been decided by the Virginia Supreme Court ten years earlier in 
Haskell. 
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Malice Aforethought (Fourth Element of Felony-Murder) 
The last requirement of the felony-murder doctrine is mens rea.·o The 
intention to commit the actual murder, as well as to commit the felony, is 
required. According to Wooden, all of the requirements of common law murder 
must be satisfied by the accomplice (principal in the second degree) in order to 
apply the felony-murder doctrine." The actus reus is satisfied by the 
accomplices' participation in the initial felony, the corpus delicti and proximate 
cause requirements are satisfied as described in the previous two sections and the 
mens rea requirement is satisfied by the application of a rule stipulated in 
Heacock.·2 
.0. Discussion of Mens Rea 
There are generally four levels of intent: purpose (specific intent), knowing 
(general intent), reckless (unjustifiable risk or gross negligence), and negligence 
(lack of reasonable care). 
The mens rea or intent required by felony-murder shifts in accordance with 
the underlying felony. This is due to the implied malice inherent in the doctrine. 
Thus, robbery which connotes a specific intent carries over to the murder. This 
is a logical progression of intent, as Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.32 would apply the 
felony-murder rule to the charge of first degree murder. First degree murder, 
like robbery, is a specific intent crime. Larceny is also a specific intent crime, 
but does not come under the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.32 in its application of the 
felony-murder rule. The defendant in a larceny case is convicted under the Va. 
Code Ann. Sec. 18.33 felony-murder rule of second degree murder, yet the larceny 
defendant had the same type of intent as the robber in the first scenario. Can it 
then be presumed that Felony-Murder is a specific intent crime applying to Va. 
Code Ann. Sec.Sec. 18.32 and 18.33 equally? The answer is no. An example 
is found in nonfeasance crimes, as when a truck driver fails to comply with a 
safety regulation that is required under federal law. The crime is not a specific 
intent crime, but one of general intent. The intent distinction is due to a 
circumstance in which the driver may be aware of the way a chemical is being 
transported without being aware of the regulations that govern that 
transportation. The result is termed "strict liability". If someone is killed due to 
the lack of compliance with the safety regulation, the driver could be found 
guilty of second degree murder under the Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.33 felony-murder 
rule because. the failure to meet the safety regulations is a felony. Thus, a 
general intent crime can impute the malice necessary to establish second degree 
murder. This proposition defeats any notion of logical order between the 
underlying felony and the murder as it would pertain to Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.33 
mens rea. 
Therefore, one may conclude that all specific and general intent underlying 
felonies apply to Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.33, while only specific intent crimes 
pertain to Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.32. All crimes stipulated under the latter 
statute are specific intent crimes. 
Recklessness and negligence have no application to the rule . 
• 1 Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758,284 S.E.2d 811 (1981). 
42 Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984). 
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According to the Heacock rule, the act of committing a felony gives rise to 
imputed (implied and constructive) malice.",3 This malice satisfies the intent 
requirement for mens rea or "malice aforethought"."'"' Malice is imputed because 
the felons who committed the murder had the original mens rea necessary to 
commit the original felony. Hence the felony mens rea is transferred to the 
murder and satisfies by judicial interpretation the malice requirement. Therefore, 
as a matter of law, if the accomplice meets the intent requirement for committing 
the felony, he also meets the intent requirement for the murder. As a result, 
the accomplice may be liable for the murder of an innocent victim by the 
principal felon through transference. 
However, there are certain exceptions to the Heacock rule that tend to limit 
its application in regard to the imputation of malice in the felony-murder 
doctrine. There is no transference where the victim is killed by anyone other 
than one of the felons.45 To do otherwise would impute malice where none had 
existed previously. The malice of the "principal in the first degree" is imputed to 
his accomplice in the felony only. This distinction is very important as a 
policeman or victim who shoots a co-felon cannot be used as a "principal in the 
first degree" to convict one of the other co-felons for the murder of a 
conf edera teo 46 
43 [d. 
44 See Commonwealth V. Gibson, 4 Va. 70 (1817). 
45. Where does Felony-Murder malice originate? 
There have been many theories as to how the malice is actually transferred. 
Some jurists have argued that the malice comes from the "principal in the first 
degree", Wooden V. Commonwealth, 222 Va. at 758, 284 S.E.2d at 811. Others 
have specified that it is the inherent nature of the original felony that gives rise 
to the malice, Heacock V. Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 397, 323 S.E.2d at 90. 
However, the best reasoning behind the imputation of malice comes from the 
common law. Francis B. Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law, 527-531 (1930), quoting 
the common law from Regina V. Serne and another, 16 Cox e.C. 311 (1887) and 
People V. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777,402 P.2d 130,44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965). 
Because the common law purpose is to punish accomplices who could have 
prevented the murder by not participating in the original crime, the mens rea for 
the initial felony passes to the murder regardless of the nature of the underlying 
felony and regardless of the intent of the "principal in the first degree". For 
this reason it is entirely possible for a robber to accidentally kill a victim 
without malice. If the robber dropped his weapon, thereby setting off the trigger 
and killing a bystander, his malice would be constructively transferred, to the 
accomplice. For a discussion of the problems that come with the court's view of 
malice in Wooden and Heacock see footnote 50. 
"'6 Wooden V. Commonwealth, 222 Va. at 758, 284 S.E.2d at 811. 
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An example of this scenario is found in Wooden. In that case, the felons 
broke into the victim's apartment at night and waited for him to return in order 
to rob him. When the victim arrived, he shot and killed one of the felons. The 
court held that the other felon, the defendant in the case, was not liable for the 
death of his co-felon as the victim's shooting was done without malice and was 
classified as a justifiable homicide.47 The same rule applies to police officers 
who kill co-felons in a shootout.48 
In Heacock, it was further held that a felon who aids and abets another felon 
(principal) in committing a felony and the principal felon dies either accidentally 
or due to the dangerous nature of the felony, malice is imputed to the accomplice 
felon.49 
King v. Commonwealth (A Problem Case) 
King v. Commonwealth raised questions about the scope of "furtherance" and 
the meaning of "inherently dangerous".50 The defendant and victim were in the 
business of transporting and distributing illegal drugs for a drug smuggling 
operation. While flying over North Carolina and Virginia the victim, who was 
piloting the plane without a license, flew low in order to evade detection by law 
enf orcement agencies. While flying at this dangerous altitude, the pilot lost 
47 Id. 
48 See Redline v. Commonwealth, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) (a 
policeman shot a felon and malice was not imputed.) 
49. Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984). 
Malicious Suicide? 
The logic behind the imputed malice theory seems to break down in Heacock. 
The malice not only is imputed from the principal, but from the nature of the 
felony. The disturbing Question presented is whether in a felony other than 
murder there can be imputed malice as. a matter of law. Larceny, for example, 
has no malice element, yet under the required Felony-Murder conditions the court 
could deem its existence. Even if this notion of malice from the felony were 
rejected, the court would still be left to decide whether one can have malice 
towards oneself. For the principal's malice to be imputed to the accomplice, the 
malice is transferred from the principal's intent to the accomplice's. Thus the 
principal must direct his malice toward himself to transfer it to another. If this 
be true, than it begs the question, "Can suicide be malicious?" The answers to 
any of the questions that present themselves when a discussion of the imputed 
malice in Heacock is commenced will continue to be controversial and disturbing 
until the court explains how the malice element of Felony-Murder in this case is 
truly satisfied. 
50 King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351 (1988). 
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control of the plane and crashed into a mountainside. The other felon, the 
defendant in the case, who acted as navigator, was the only one who survived the 
crash. He was convicted under the felony-murder doctrine.51 
The court in King incorrectly held that the act of distributing drugs was not 
"inherently dangerous", even though the Virginia Supreme Court heid in Heacock 
that marijuana is of the class of drugs that is "inherently dangerous".52 The 
court in King distinguished that case from Heacock' in that Heacock involved 
cocaine, but here marijuana, a less harmful drug, was involved.53 However, 
according to the supreme court's reasoning in Heacock concerning drugs that can 
kill, both cocaine and marijuana are "inherently dangerous". 
The best argument against using marijuana under the felony-murder doctrine 
that the court in King should· have mentioned is not that it is not "inherently 
dangerous", but that in most states possession below a certain amount is a 
misdemeanor and not a felony. Distribution,· as stated in Heacock, makes the 
dealer an accomplice to the felony of possession. Thus, if the possession is not a 
felony, the first requirement of felony-murder is not met and there is no 
transference of malice to the accomplice. 
The key to this case was not the blunder by the Court of Appeals in 
incorrectly defining "inherently dangerous", but in its misinterpretation of 
proximate cause. According to Haskell and Wooden the murder must "further" the 
felony in a causal connection.54 However, that connection does not need to be 
as restricted as the court in King believed. The court in King found no 
51 [d. 
52 "Inherently dangerous" refers to drugs that have the propensity to kill 
and. to. ,be addict,ive. See gene.rally. Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 404, 323 
S.E.2d at 97. Unfortunately, in many states mere possession of various classes of 
"inherently dangerous" drugs is not a felony. An example of this classification in 
Virginia is marijuana. Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-248 and Sec. 18.2-249 (1982 and 
Supp. 1986, 1987). 
53 However, just as cocaine can kill, so maTlJuana can kill also. Although 
marijuana is cumulative in nature and not prone to an overdose as is cocaine, 
according to Helen Jones, a noted drug expert, marijuana can kill brain cells and 
cause cancer and heart disease. Jones, On Marijuana Reconsidered, Addictive 
Behavior: Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 109-113 (1985). See also R. Petersen, 
Marijuana Overview, Addictive Behavior: Drug and Alcohol Abuse 116-126 (1985). 
Additionally, marijuana is addictive like cocaine. "One of the most widely 
accepted misconceptions about marijuana is that a user will not develop physical 
or psychological dependence. Neither is true." [d. at 112. 
54. Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033, 1044,243 S.E.2d 477,483 (1978). 
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connection between the fog that caused the accident and the drug trade,56 but 
failed to consider the reason why the plane was in the air or why it was flying 
low in mountainous terrain, which an experienced pilot, such as the defendant, 
would not do.56 The court contended that the cause of the crash was the fog. 
The principal cause of the crash was in fact the low flying, not the fog, done to 
hide from law enforcement authorities so as not to be caught transporting a 
controlled substance.57 The ring leader of the smuggling organization admitted 
that his employees were flying ridiculously low for ascertaining their location.58 
There was a "causal connection" between the crash and the felony. 
The victim was furthering the felony by flying low to avoid detection. The 
defendant was aiding and abetting the victim by navigating the plane. Hence, 
proximate cause is easily established and the faulty reasoning of the court in 
. 
King, which restricted "furtherance" and felony-murder, should be disregarded in 
favor of the Virginia Supreme Court's more expansive ruling in Haskell which 
gives the felony-murder doctrine a more expansive reading. 
Possible Defenses to the Felony-Murder Doctrine 
In order to fully understand the scope of the felony-murder doctrine, one must 
not only be acquainted with the elements necessitating the doctrine, but also 
with the defenses that may be used by the defendant. There are eight defenses 
to felony-murder that may be employed by the defendant at trial. Seven of these 
defenses are categorized as affirmative defenses and acknowledge that the 
prosecution has made out a prima jacie case against the defendant for the crime 
charged. The burden rests with the defendant to prove his affirmative defenses. 
1. Prosecution's Failure To Meet Its Burden 
This is the most common of all the defenses that can be used and is the only 
nonaffirmative defense that can be employed by the defendant. Failure by the 
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the aforementioned 
elements to felony-murder will constitute a valid defense. The major factor 
55 King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351 (1988). 
56 The defendant contended that he flew low to avoid bad weather and to 
locate himself. Any logical inquiry into the facts would render this argument 
incredible. The better choice that an experienced pilot, like the defendant, would 
make would be to fly above the fog and radio the nearest airport for assistance. 
57. [d. at 10-11. 
58 See Appellee Brief at 10, King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351 (1988) 
(No. 0998-86-3). 
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facilitating the successful use of this defense by the defendant is disproving the 
underlying felony. In all cases, the dismissal of the underlying felony amounts to 
a dismissal of felony-murder. 
2. Withdrawal 
The accomplice can contend that he had withdrawn from the felony and that 
the causal connection between the accomplice and the felony had been broken 
before the murder took place.59 The accomplice cannot just use verbal language 
to withdraw but must be physically remove himself. The strongest case for the 
withdrawal defense is when the accomplice calls the police to stop the "principal 
in the first degree" from completing the felony.60 
3. The New York Defense 
This defense is presently unrecognized in Virginia, but is a persuasive theory 
that has been made part of the criminal code in New York. The requirements for 
this defense are as follows: 
1. "Principal in the second degree" did not directly aid the "principal in the 
first degree" in the commission of the homicide. 
2. "Principal in the second degree" was not armed. 
3. "Principal in the second degree" did not think the "principal in the first 
degree" was armed. 
4. "Principal in the second degree" had no reasonable grounds to believe that 
the co-felon intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or 
serious physical injury.61 
Although this is a minority view, it is a well-liked theory that may have success 
in the future in Virginia.62 
59 State v. Thomas, 140 N.J. Super. 429, 356 A.2d 433 (1976). 
60 [d. at 433. 
61 N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 125.25(3) (1987). 
62 LaFave and Scott, supra, at 10. 
65 
4. Self Defense 
The defendant may attempt to show that the "principal in the first degree" 
acted out of necessity in fear for his own life in killing the victim.6s The 
difficulty in sustaining the argument lies in the standard of the self defense 
doctrine. The standard states, in part, "a man shall not in any case justify the 
killing of another by a pretense of necessity, unless he were without fault in 
bringing that necessity upon himself."64 In a case of felony-murder, the killing is 
only necessary because of the felon's culpable conduct. Hence, self defense is 
never a viable affirmative defense to felony-murder. 
5. Intoxication 
The defendant claims that he was intoxicated and did not possess the required 
intent to kill the victim or to commit the felony. The use of intoxication to 
• 
negate an intent to kill is a g.enerally accepted. defense to premeditation in first 
degree murder. However, in felony-murder the malice is imputed so as to avoid 
an analysis of the specific intent to kill. Only the intent to commit the 
underlying felony must be proven. Thus the use of intoxication to void mens rea 
is valid only in regard to the underlying felony. 
Voluntary intoxication has consistently been held not to be a bar to the 
question of intent,65 but if shown acts only to mitigate premeditation in first 
degree murder.66 Therefore, if an accomplice becomes voluntarily intoxicated 
before the felony in order to get up his nerve to participate in the crime, he may 
not use his lack of sobriety as an excuse. Only involuntary intoxication is a 
valid defense to felony-murder. Involuntary intoxication as it pertains to forming 
the prerequisite intent is not a presumption, but goes to the weight of the 
evidence in demonstrating whether the defendant was intoxicated enough so that 
his ability to form the necessary intent was impaired.67 
6S Clark v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 360, 18 S.E. 440 (1893). 
64 Bausell v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 669, 181 S.E. 453 (1935). 
65 Gill v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 445, 126 S.E. 51 (1925). 
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(1979). 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 312, 313, reh'n denied, 444 U.S. 890 
67 See generally Giarrantano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94 
(1980) (mere intoxication is not a per se defense to "intent"). 
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6. Insanity Defense 
In order to use this defense, the accomplice must be so out of touch with 
reality that he cannot comprehend the character and consequences of his actions. 
The defendant is classified as partially insane if he has periods of lucidity where 
he can understand his actions. Partial insanity cannot be used as a defense.68 
7. Coercion 
The defendant could contend under this defense that the "principal in the first 
degree" forced him to be a. party to the felony, thus negating the defendant's 
volition. The defendant must establish a sufficient amount of evidence to 
substantiate his claim. Past actions of the "principal" in dealing with the 
defendant supply the key evidence in this regard.69 
8. Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Eighth Amendment) 
The criminal justice system's belief in fairness demands that the punishment be 
commensurate with the offense. Murder is the most serious of charges and 
provokes the most extreme retribution, which in some jurisdictions includes 
death.70 Thus, the burden on the commonwealth to prove murder is a strong one, 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Through the "accomplice theory" as articulated in 
Briley, the accomplice is treated as a principal to the felony in which he 
participated.71 It is unfair to extend felony-murder by the accomplice theory to 
a situation where an accomplice consciously participated in one felony, but is 
charged in the commission of another felony. The accomplice in that case is of 
course not as culpable as the "principal in the first degree". Even in murder 
cases where there is no underlying felony, the accomplice is convicted of a lesser 
offense, generally second degree murder. In felony-murder the need to prove 
culpability is deleted by Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.32, which specifies a punishment 
68 Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 876-7 (1881). 
69 In order to determine a "reasonable reliance" by the defendant on the 
fact that the principal would injure or kill him unless he helped commit the 
felony, a prior history that shows a trend of abuse must be established by 
extrinsic evidence. Any prior court proceedings showing abuse of the defendant 
by the principal can be used toward the weight of the evidence demonstrating 
coercion. 
70 See generally Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.31 (1988). 
71 Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 273 S.E.2d 57 (1980). 
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of first degree murder.72 Perhaps Chief Justice Traynor put it best when he 
stated that the felony-murder rule "erodes the relation between criminal liability 
and moral culpability.n73 
Additionally, there are problems in the transference of malice to the 
accomplice. It is awkward to convict an accomplice with a general intent to 
commit murder7• of a specific intent offense such as first degree murder.76 
Malice and premeditation are imputed.76 The result is a first degree murder 
conviction under felony-murder that meets none of the elements of murder. 
The question of excessive punishment is strong under these circumstances, 
especially if the policy behind the punishment is general deterrence.77 Is general 
deterrence a sufficiently strong policy to impose first degree murder on an 
accomplice who may not have satisfied all of the elements of murder? The 
72 Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.32 (1988) (stipulation of certain underlying 
felonies as raISIng the level of murder participated in by an accomplice to first 
degree murder). 
73 J. Cook and P. Marcus, Criminal Law 505 (2d ed. 1988) quoting People v. 
Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965). 
7. Va. Code Ann. Sec.18.32 imputes a presumption of knowledge for certain 
felonies, as mentioned above. 
76. J. Cook and P. Marcus, supra note 73. 
76 For a more complete discussion of malice and Felony-Murder see supra 
40 and 49. 
77 See generally, Francis Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law, 527, 527-31 (1930), 
quoting Regina v. Serne and another, 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887). Serne discusses 
felony-murder in terms of the common law and implies the reasoning behind the 
harsh doctrine to be twofold: first, people intend the consequences of their 
actions and second, the law must discourage dangerous felonies. See also 
Washington, 62 Ca1.2d at 777,402 P.2d at 130,44 Cal. Rptr. at 442. 
Is the Felony-Murder Doctrine Fair? 
There is a heated debate between jurists as to the fairness of the Felony-
Murder rule. The opponents of the rule contend that an accomplice should not be 
forced into rescuing a crime victim. The general rule, whether in tort law or 
criminal law, is that there is no duty to rescue. Therefore the policy of 
promoting the rescue of victims either before or during the commission of the 
felony by deterring the accomplice is defective. 
However, the rescuer doctrine does have some notable exceptions. One such 
exception is if the rescuer caused the conditions that warrant rescue. See 
Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 221 N.C. 292, 20 S.E.2d 299 (1942) and 
Hardy v. Brooks, 103 Ga. App. 124, 118 S.E.2d 492 (1961). Because the 
accomplice's own actions in engaging in the underlying felony caused the 
condition, it is only fair that the accomplice be held liable to remedy it. 
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question may only be answered by individual legislatures that have the 
responsibility of weighing the pros and cons of such a contradiction. However, a 
court can impose its will on a case by case basis, and the defendant's attorney, 
using an Eighth Amendment argument, must exploit that role of the judiciary to 
overturn a first-degree felony-murder conviction.78 
CONCLUSION 
The felony-murder doctrine allows an accomplice to a felony to be convicted 
of first or second degree murder when a murder he did not commit occurs while 
the felony is in progress. In order to apply this doctrine, a number of elements 
must be met. When using this legal theory to convict an accomplice, jury 
instructions must contain each of the following requirements: 
1. Actus Reus (committing the initial felony) 
a. The accomplice must be aiding and abetting, keeping watch or lookout, 
encouraging or inciting the "principal in the first degree" to commit the 
initial felony. 
b. The accomplice must act with purpose or knowingly while aiding and 
abetting the "principal in the first degree" to commit the initial felony. 
c. The murder must take place while the initial felony is in progress. 
d. The intent to commit the felony by the "principal in the first degree" 
must antedate the intent to commit the murder. 
2. Corpus Delicti (crime committed by a criminal· agent) 
a. There must be evidence to suggest beyond reasonable doubt that a human 
being has been killed. 
3. Proximate Cause 
a. "But for" this particular felony, the murder would not have occurred, 
must be answered in the affirmative. 
b. The murder must be foreseeable. 
c. The murder must "further" the purpose of the felony by being closely 
related in point of time, place, and causal connection. 
4. Mens Rea (intent) 
a. As long as the accomplice acted with intent to commit a felony 
(requirements La. and l.b. are satisfied), there is "implied malice" to 
commit the murder and mens rea is satisfied. However, this imputed 
malice does not apply where the "principal in the first degree" is the 
victim (non-felon) or a law enforcement official. 
78 Although lack of Due Process is an additional constitutional defense 
that could be used to combat first degree Felony-Murder, it is nevertheless a 
defense that would fail because the Felony-Murder doctrine was codified and in 
common usage in most jurisdictions in the early nineteenth century. 
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As long as these elements are included in the jury instructions, the felony-
murder rule may apply. The distinction in charges and penalties to the 
accomplice is based entirely on the type of felony. Any of the specifically listed 
felonies under Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-32 carries a charge of first degree murder 
and is punishable as a Class 2 felony, while any non-listed felony coupled with 
accidental death or a non-listed "inherently dangerous felony" carries a charge of 
second degree murder and is punishable as a Class 3 felony. 
In conclusion, it may be noted that this doctrine is not as well developed in 
Virginia ,as it is in many other states. As the quantity of case law expands, so 
will the applicability and requirements of the doctrine. Virginia is now beginning 
to use felo.ny-murder more liberally as a viable theory in criminal law. 
This trend began in the mid-1970s with the approval of the Virginia Supreme 
# 
Court. However, with the new Virginia Court of Appeals, the use of the doctrine 
has been restricted. King may indicate that the court of appeals is trying to 
follow in the footsteps of the Michigan Supreme Court by abolishing felony-
murder. The difference is that Michigan's felony-murder rule was never codified, 
as opposed to Virginia's. The legislative protection of felony-murder will keep 
the doctrine available to prosecutors in the future with the hope that judicial 
deference a goal of the law, deterring crime, will override the protection of 
criminals at the expense of the community. The doctrine may seem harsh to the 
criminal, but so are the effects on a family who loses their father to a robber's 
bullet. 
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Appendix: Recommended Virginia Jury Instructions 
First Degree Felony Homicide 
The defendant' is charged with the crime of first degree murder. The 
Commonwealth must prove beyond' a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements of that crime: 
l. That (Name of Victim) was killed by (Name of "Principal in the First 
Degree") who was a' party to the (Name of Felony). 
2. That (Name of the Defendant) was a "principle in the second degree" to 
the (Name of Felony). 
3. That the felony committed was either arson, rape, forcible sodomy, 
inanimate object sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction. 
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the offense as charged, then you 
shall find the defendant guilty and fix his punishment at: 
l. Imprisonment for life; or 
2. A specific term of imprisonment, but not less than twenty (20) years. 
If you find that the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt anyone or more of the elements of the offense, then you shall find the 
defendant not guilty of felony homicide.19 
19 See Generally, MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE, VIRGINIA MODEL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL VOL. I 503 (1985 & Supp. 1987). 
First Degree Felony-Murder is not addressed specifically in the Virginia 
Model Jury Instructions, but is instead mentioned as an afterthought in the 
instructions for First Degree Murder. The difficulty with the Virginia Model Jury 
Instruction's definition of First Degree Felony-Murder revolves around the 
inference that only the principal can be prosecuted for First Degree Murder. 
That assumption is incorrect. The purpose of the doctrine is to punish 
accomplices who participate in dangerous felonies equally with the "Principal in 
the First Degree". By punishing accomplices 'commensurate with the principal, the 
State hopes to deter dangerous crimes by encouraging accomplices to withdraw 
from assisting principal actors in the commission of dangerous felonies. See 
Generally People v. Washington 62 Cal.2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 
(1965). 
71 
Second Degree Felony Homicide 
The defendant is charged with the crime of felony homicide. The 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements of that crime: 
l. That (Name of Victim) was killed by (Name of "Principal in the First 
Degree") who was a party to the (Name of Felony). 
2. That (Name of the Defendant) was a "principle in the second degree" to 
the (Name of Felony). 
3. That the killing in the (Name of Felony) was accidental and contrary to 
the intentions of the defendant. 
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the offense as charged, then you 
shall find the defendant guilty and fix his punishment at a specific term of 
~ 
imprisonment, but not less than five (5) years 
If you find that the Commonwealth 
nor more than twenty (20) years. 
has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt anyone or more of the elements of the offense, then you shall 
find the defendant not guilty of felony homicide.80 
80. [d. 
For a basic guide on how Second Degree Felony-Murder instructions should 
be structured, the Virginia Model Jury Instructions are a good starting point. 
However, the instructions specifically detailing Second Degree Felony-Murder are 
incomplete and should not be used without further expansion. 
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